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Chapter 1
Introduction
Finance studies the exchange of money for repayment promises—finance is about
using other people’s money. In canonical complete-markets models, financial
exchange is no different from the exchange of money for a loaf of bread, say, and
the first welfare theorem of economics pertains.1
In reality, financial trades can be more problematic: they are trades over time
and carry an element of risk, as unforeseen contingencies may arise. Furthermore,
financial exchange causes principal-agent problems, as borrowers cannot be per-
fectly controlled by financiers. Capital markets, in other words, are not complete
contingent markets.
It follows that canonical models need to be modified by recognizing capi-
tal market frictions such as those driven by imperfect information, imperfect en-
forcement and political intervention. This dissertation investigates capital market
frictions across three themes.
The first theme of this dissertation is sovereign debt, the topic of chapter
2. Recent experience in the EU shows that enforcement of repayment promises
is complex when the borrower is a state. Furthermore, governments are better
informed about their repayment capacity than creditors are. Chapter 2 argues
that enforcement and information frictions explain why sovereign borrowers issue
simple debt contracts that frequently lead to debt crises and debt renegotiations.
Such contracts are optimal because they save on costly audits by creditors.
1Specifically, if complete contingent contracts are available and markets are free (i.e. in an
Arrow-Debreu world), the resulting market allocation is efficient.
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The second theme of this dissertation concerns pensions, the topic of chapter
3. It is often argued that collective pension funds, such as found in the Nether-
lands, can enhance the welfare of their participants. Chapter 3 highlights one
rationale for pension funds based on credit constraints (i.e. a capital market fric-
tion). Chapter 3 next explores an agency problem (i.e. a second friction) that may
limit pension funds’ ability to increase welfare.
The third theme of this dissertation concerns political intervention in capi-
tal markets, the topic of chapter 4. Financial liberalization and expanded access
to capital are historically seen as signs of greater freedom. Yet many democratic
countries choose to restrain the resource allocation called for by a free capital mar-
ket. Chapter 4 argues that democracies may choose to resist free capital markets
depending on demographical context, the concentration of wealth, and the rate of
technological progress. In effect, democracies favor income stability over eco-
nomic growth when the population is older, when the concentration of wealth is
uneven, and when the rate of technological progress is high. The rest of this intro-
duction gives summaries of the three main chapters, and describes their method-
ology, before concluding with avenues for future research based on the current
work.
1.1 Chapter Summaries
Each of the chapters 2-4, is a stand-alone contribution and can be read indepen-
dently of the other chapters. Each chapter starts with an introduction, then presents
a model and results, before ending with a conclusion. Proofs are generally rele-
gated to the appendix, unless they are short. In the following, I will try to give a
brief, non-technical summary of each chapter.
1.1.1 Sovereign Debt
Chapter 2 is based on Bersem (2012) and focuses on sovereign debt. Debt is a
financial contract in which a borrower receives some money and agrees to pay it
back at a later date. When the borrower does not repay, creditors obtain certain
rights vis-à-vis the borrower’s assets, e.g., they may obtain the right to seize and
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sell the collateral that the borrower posted. Such rights facilitate financial trades
and allow the proper functioning of financial markets. Indeed, credit markets are
largest in countries where creditor and investor rights are strongest (La Porta et
al., 1997;1998).
Sovereign debt is the debt contracted by sovereign borrowers, i.e., states like
Greece. Creditor rights are typically difficult to impose on sovereign borrowers.
No court can force an unwilling sovereign debtor to repay. Rather, the repayment
of sovereign debt is a political question, decided upon by governments based on
economic and political considerations—creditors of Greece were duly reminded
of this simple fact in the March 2012 default.2
Still, sovereign debt markets are huge: there was more than $34 trillion of
outstanding sovereign debt in 2009; thereby, sovereign debt accounted for about
40% of the value of global bond markets (Source: Bank of International Settle-
ments, BIS).3 The literature on sovereign debt has spelled out, both theoretically
and empirically, how positive repayment can be sustained, even in the absence of
a court. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) summarize this literature as, ‘concerns over
future access to capital markets, maintaining trade, and possibly broader interna-
tional relations all support debt flows.’ Chapter 2 builds on the sovereign debt
literature by taking as given that positive repayment can be sustained; the chapter
seeks to extend the sovereign debt literature by asking an obvious complementary
question: what is the form of the optimal borrowing agreement?4
Sovereign borrowers can be described as borrowers who can repudiate their re-
payment obligations at any time, i.e., repay nothing; and, whose exact repayment
capacity is hard to observe for outsiders, as it depends on the specific political
economic calculus of the government in office. The main question of chapter 2
is how to extend credit to such a borrower. Common sense—and knowledge of
history—suggest that creditors need to be careful.5
Chapter 2 shows that, given enforcement and information constraints, the op-
2This enforcement problem is known, in the literature, as the willingness-to-pay problem
(Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981).
3Greece alone had C350 billion of debt, before its March 2012 default—the biggest sovereign
default in history.
4Optimal in the sense of minimizing agency costs.
5Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) survey eight centuries of financial crises, among which there are
many sovereign debt crises.
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timal borrowing agreement is a contract that specifies (i) a fixed payment, or face
value, in high income states, and (ii) a default if the sovereign’s willingness-to-
pay falls short of the face value, where (iia) default is partial rather than complete,
and (iib) the default repayment depends on the power that creditors have to pun-
ish repudiation. This result explains three salient facts of sovereign borrowing.
First, the result explains why sovereign borrowers, choose to issue simple debt
instruments instead of more contingent contracts, as Shleifer (2003) and others
have argued they should (cf. Borensztein and Mauro, 2004). Such contracts are
not optimal, because the auditing requirements would be prohibitively costly, i.e.,
the agency costs are too high for such contracts.
Furthermore, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document, some countries de-
fault at very low debt-to-GDP levels; other countries continue to repay their debt
at very high debt-to-GDP levels.6 Chapter 2 explains this empirical finding by
pointing to four factors that determine the government’s repayment decision: (i)
the available budget, (ii) the economic costs of repudiation (i.e. creditor power),
(iii) the political costs of default, and (iv) creditor coordination costs.
Finally, conditional on default, there is a wide dispersion on how much cred-
itors recover from the sovereign borrower (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006).
Chapter 2 explains this empirical finding by pointing to creditor power as the rel-
evant determinant of recovery. The most powerful creditor is the International
Monetary Fund (IMF); historically, the IMF takes priority over all other creditors.
It follows that, even if rates on IMF loans are lower than on other loans, IMF
lending is not concessionary: the IMF simply expects to be repaid with higher
probability, and to recover more in case of a default.
Chapter 2 shows that an increase in the costs of repudiation, be they political or
economic costs, lowers the interest rate on sovereign debt through a commitment
effect: higher costs of repudiation commit the sovereign to repay the debt at face
value in more states of the world; thus, reducing sovereign risk.
6A similar picture emerges for other measures of a sovereign’s ability to pay.
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1.1.2 Collective Pension Funds
Chapter 3 is based on Bersem and Hollanders (2012) and focuses on collective
pension funds. A pension is a payment stream that people receive upon retirement,
i.e., when they leave the labor force. Rather than leaving it to individuals to save
for their retirement, most advanced economies have pension systems in which
individuals are required to participate. Common to such systems is that people
contribute in their active working years, which entitles them to a pension benefit
upon retirement.7 But there is considerable variation between countries in how
the pension system operates, how it is financed, and how pension benefits are
determined.8
For example, some countries, like Germany, operate pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
pension systems, where the active working population pays for the current retirees.
Other countries, like the Netherlands, operate additional prefunded schemes, in
which people save through pension contributions and receive a pension benefit
that is set according to the pension contract. Roughly, one can distinguish two
types of pension contracts: defined-contribution (DC) type contracts, where the
pension benefit depends explicitly on investment returns (e.g. the famous 401(k)
plans in the U.S.), and defined-benefit (DB) type contracts, where the pension is
set according to a formula that may depend on average pay, years of employment,
age at retirement, and other factors (e.g. the second pillar in the Netherlands).
Prefunded DB pension schemes run into trouble when they are underfunded,
i.e., when pension liabilities, which are fixed, exceed pension assets, which may
fluctuate. Such pension shortfalls are an inherent risk—and recurring feature—of
funded DB pension schemes.9 After the 2008 credit crisis, more than half of
the pension funds in the Netherlands were underfunded. The decline in pen-
sion wealth led to controversy over who should pay to restore the solvency of
7This seems an obvious requirement, but note that the first generation in a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) pension system receives a pension without having paid contributions.
8World Bank (1994) gives a useful categorization of pension systems into three pillars: a state
pension, aimed at poverty reduction, and financed through taxes; an occupational pension, aimed
to maintain the standard of living, and prefunded; and a private pension, allowing for individual
supplements, also prefunded.
9For example, General Motor’s defined-benefit pension plans reported a shortfall of $35 billion
in 2011; this exceeded GM’s market value.
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the pension system—Dutch regulations required a return to solvency within 5
years.10 In recognition of the intrinsic tensions in DB pension systems with mis-
match risk, DB pension schemes are being replaced with DC pension schemes,
cf. Goudzwaard et al. (2009). This then leads to the question how such DC
schemes perform. Chapter 3 explores one rationale for a DC pension scheme that
has received little attention in the literature: that pension funds exist to lift credit
constraints and implement the optimal optimal life-cycle investment strategy of
participating generations.11
The literature on modern life-cycle investment theory shows that individu-
als’ optimal investment strategy depends on their age: the young—who have hu-
man capital as well as financial capital—should invest their financial capital in
a riskier manner than retirees—who have only financial capital (Bodie, Merton,
and Samuelson, 1992). With their human capital, the young are naturally hedged
against stock market risk. Typically, these models require the young to take a
leveraged position in the stock market, i.e., to borrow and invest the proceeds in
the stock market. If the young face credit constraints, this strategy is not feasible
and pension funds have a role to play: pension funds can implement the young’s
preferred investment strategy by extending them credit.12 There are two reasons
why pension funds are better placed than private sector lenders to extend credit to
the young: (i) participation is mandatory, reducing the adverse selection problem;
and (ii) pension funds have access to a tax on human wealth, which allows them to
enforce repayment. In effect, the pension fund helps to secure the human capital
of participants as collateral (Bovenberg et al., 2007).
Chapter 3 shows that implementation of optimal investment strategies can in
fact be achieved by a DC pension scheme, where participants pay contributions
into a generational account (e.g. yearly), and pension funds invest these contribu-
tions on behalf of participants. The ability of pension funds to increase welfare is
dependent on the assumption that pension funds can collateralize the human cap-
10By cutting entitlements, pension funds decrease their liabilities; by raising contribu-
tions—while keeping entitlements fixed—pension funds increase their assets.
11The notable exception is Bovenberg et al. (2007) ; Teulings and de Vries (2006) mention but
do not pursue this rationale for pension funds.
12Bovenberg et al. (2007) provide a review of different rationales for pension funds; the review
discusses alleviation of borrowing constraints as one possible rationale.
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ital of participants. Recent experience in the Netherlands shows that this assump-
tion canot be taken for granted, as it may prove impossible to raise contributions
after a low stock market outcome—and in particular in a recession. It follows that
the DC pension scheme we describe may run into the same problems as a DB
pension scheme with mismatch risk, and that the ex-ante optimal risk level at the
pension fund cannot be separated from the ex post contribution policy.
Indeed, one suggestive interpretation of the distributional conflict witnessed
in the Netherlands is that pension funds—which, de facto, run a combination of
DB and DC pension contracts—took risk on behalf of the young, assuming that
contributions could be raised in case of a pension shortfall. When this proved
infeasible, a controversy over who should pay for the shortfall was the result.
This ex post distributional conflict leads to an ex ante governance conflict at the
pension fund: older participants wish to limit risk taking such that they are repaid
in every contingency.
1.1.3 Political Intervention in Capital Markets
Chapter 4 is based on Bersem, Perotti, and von Thadden (2012) and focuses on
political intervention in capital markets. Capital markets, also denoted financial
markets, are markets where banks and other financial intermediaries trade finan-
cial securities; they are markets through which the financial sector moves money
from point A, where it is, to point B, where it is needed. In the ideal type of the
free capital market, capital moves naturally towards its most profitable use and, by
allowing the financing of new ventures, keeps alive the process of creative destruc-
tion, whereby old firms and organizations are constantly challenged and replaced
by new ones (Schumpeter, 1942). In reality, however, the functioning of capital
markets varies greatly between countries: it is much harder to obtain financing for
new, daring, disruptive ideas in some countries than it is in others.
(Wurgler, 2000) has shown that industries with better growth prospects are
able to invest more in countries that are more financially developed; these are
also the countries in which declining sectors shrink faster.13 Rajan and Zingales
13Wurgler (2000) finds, furthermore, that (i) a high degree of minority investor protection, and
(ii) a lesser extent of state ownership in the economy are both associated with a better allocation
of capital; evidence suggestive of the importance of political influence on capital markets.
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(1998) show that industries that are more reliant on external finance, grow faster
in countries where financial markets are more developed. Indeed, this was already
observed by Walter Bagehot in his famous book Lombard Street: A Description
of the Money Market :14
“Political economists say that capital sets towards the most profitable
trades, and that it rapidly leaves the less profitable non-paying trades.
But in ordinary countries this is a slow process.”
But what can account for these differences? As Rajan and Zingales (2003) point
out, markets rely on the political goodwill for their infrastructure (which includes,
e.g., the rule of law and how it is enforced).
The main contribution of chapter 4 is to explain why unrestricted capital mo-
bility may be opposed in democracies as a result of the wealth and age distribution
in a country’s population. The starting insight of the chapter is that labor is less
mobile than capital: while capital can easily be redeployed—think of land or real
estate—it is hard to retrain workers once they have acquired specific skills. The
result is a political conflict between generations (old vs. young); and within gen-
erations (workers vs. the capitalists). Capitalists favor the reallocation of capital
to its most productive use. Old workers, who have outdated skills, resist the real-
location of capital to newer sectors, as this leads to a fall in their productivity and
wages; old workers seek a political alliance to restrict capital mobility. Chapter 4
identifies young workers as the decisive class in society. What makes them pivotal
is not their number—they are a minority just as every other voter class—but the
fact that their preferences are the least extreme.
The preferences of the young worker depend crucially on the voting process:
If capital market frictions can be repealed in the future, young workers will not
favor them; but, if capital market frictions are permanent, young workers form an
alliance with old workers to restrict capital mobility. The intuition is that young
workers trade off lower wages when young against a job guarantee (i.e. higher
wages) when old. Young voters prefer to restrict capital mobility more if techno-
logical obsolescence is high, as this increases the wage drop when old.
14Bagehot was an English banker and editor to the Economist newspaper. Lombard Street
(1873) describes the world of finance, and the role of central banks, in common language.
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Chapter 4 shows that opposition against capital markets can be sustained if
frictions are hard to reverse. There are clear examples of institutional frictions in
capital markets which are hard to reverse. Bankruptcy law, for example, defines
specific conditions to the assignment of assets from declining sectors. While in
some countries—such as the United Kingdom—bankruptcy law is designed to
protect financial interests, in others—like France and Italy—it explicitly instructs
the liquidator to reassign capital in a manner which protects employment.
1.2 Methodology
This dissertation studies financial contracting across different themes. The liter-
ature in finance has long recognized how the neoclassic paradigm of enforceable
complete contracts needs to be modified by recognizing frictions such as those
driven by imperfect information, imperfect enforcement, and political interven-
tion. This dissertation fits into this research agenda.
Each chapter of this dissertation presents one economic model, a set of ideas
about some specific aspect of capital markets. They cover the design of sovereign
debt, pension finance, and the process of capital reallocation. They are moti-
vated by empirical observations which are hard to square within the neoclassical
paradigm.
The presentation of the models in this dissertation is formal: built on a spe-
cific set of pertinent assumptions, each chapter derives rigorously a specific set of
implications. In choosing the approach for each chapter, the guiding force was the
nature of the question at hand. With Occam’s razor in mind, I’ve tried to make the
models as simple as possible, but not simpler. It is important to state as a reminder
that economic models are an abstraction, like a map, but that the map is not the
territory.15
1.2.1 Overview
Chapter 2 (Incentive-Compatible Sovereign Debt) seeks to make a positive con-
tribution by explaining why sovereign borrowers issue very simple debt contracts.
15John Kay - ’The Map is not the Territory: An Essay on the State of Economics.’
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After all, national economies and thus fiscal capacity have specific risk expo-
sures, which may be best hedged in their financing. Yet this is almost never the
case. We pursue an explanation driven by the institutional constraints imposed
by sovereignty, which limits direct contractual enforcement, and the superior in-
formation held by governments over private parties. We show how the optimal
government debt contract resolves these constraints in a simple form.
Chapter 3 (Collective Pension Funds) seeks to make a normative contribution
by showing what features of pension funds may enhance welfare. Pensions can
improve intergenerational risk sharing by increasing the ability of the young to
sustain capital investment. They could not achieve the same privately, as adverse
selection and moral hazard limits their ability to borrow against their human capi-
tal to invest in risky, high return assets. The analysis is built on a simple modeling
of the underlying tension between generations in the process.
Chapter 4 (Sand in theWheels of Capitalism) seeks to explain why democratic
societies may oppose free capital markets. Financial liberalization and expanded
access to capital for new enterprises are historically seen as signs of greater free-
dom. Yet many democratic countries choose to restrain or contain the process of
free resource allocation called for by prices set on a free capital markets. The
literature has shown that such choices may affect growth and the rate of innova-
tion. The model here shows that the redistributive effect of a technological shock
creates a strong political demand to limit capital reallocation away from obsolete
sectors. It shows that income stability may be chosen above economic growth
when certain conditions allow the creation of persistent frictions to capital re-
allocation. So the model offers an endogenous explanation for the existence of
avoidable financial frictions.
In the following I discuss the methodology of each chapter in more detail,
before concluding with avenues for future research.
Chapter 2 (Incentive-Compatible Sovereign Debt)
Chapter 2 uses financial contract theory to model the interaction between a sove-
reign borrower and potential financiers (Hart, 2001). Specifically, I use a version
of the costly state audit model, which goes back to Townsend (1979) and Gale and
10
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Hellwig (1985).
The basic setup is familiar from corporate finance models: an agent seeks
financing from a group of financiers. There are gains from trade. The question is
whether they can be realized, and if so with what contract.
Two frictions complicate the trade: (i) there is asymmetric information that
can be resolved only at a cost; and (ii) there is no court to enforce repayment by
the agent. The second assumption is made to capture that the agent is sovereign,
rather than a corporation. Other assumptions particular to this sovereign finance
model: the cost of audit is borne by the agent, future income is an endowment.
The optimal contract I derive saves on audit costs and implements the second-
best allocation. (The first-best cannot be achieved due to prevailing enforcement
and information frictions.) Chapter 2 argues that this contract matches some em-
pirical facts of sovereign borrowing.
Chapter 3 (Collective Pension Funds)
Chapter 3 models the interaction between individuals of different age using an
overlapping-generations (OLG) model, which goes back to ?.
Chapter 3 focuses on optimal investment and, by fixing savings, abstracts from
individuals’ labor supply and consumption decision, as in Gollier (2008). There
is a capital market to which all individuals have access. The problem reduces to
choosing an optimal investment strategy. The question is whether this strategy can
be implemented.
Chapter 3 introduces a friction: future savings cannot be used as collateral,
which implies that the young are credit constrained. The assumption captures that
human capital does not collateralize loans for adverse selection and moral hazard
reasons (Constantinides et al., 2002). A pension fund can improve on the market
allocation if (i) participation is mandatory; and (ii) it has access to a tax on human
wealth. In effect, the pension fund works as a commitment device for the young
to pledge their human capital as collateral to older generations.
Credibility of the commitment device is crucial for the result. Chapter 3 argues
that when this assumption becomes problematic—in light of recent experience in
the Netherlands—it reduces the scope for pension funds to increase welfare.
11
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Chapter 4 (Sand in the Wheels of Capitalism)
Chapter 4 models the economic and political interaction between different gener-
ations with an OLG model that is extended with a simple majority vote (Persson
and Tabellini, 2000). Redistributive effects of policy on labor and capital returns
are at the heart of political economy explanations for the structure of the economy.
Chapter 4 assumes vintage human capital, which means that the labor market
is segmented. This assumption captures the difficulty of retraining workers once
they have specific skills. A realistic second type of heterogeneity arise because
the capital is largely owned by a subset of the population (the capitalists). The
capital market reallocates capital across firms, operating under conditions set by
political decisions.
The economic rationale for capital reallocation is that new sectors, where the
young work, are more productive than older sectors. The old wish to block capital
reallocation as it reduces their wages. The political conflict exists as long as cap-
ital and labor are complementary factors of production; as long as human capital
is less mobile than physical capital; and as long as human capital risk cannot be
fully insured.
In each period, a vote takes place: individuals can choose a capital market
friction, which slows down the subsequent reallocation of capital in the economy.
The question is whether such a friction will be chosen under majority rule.
In the Chapter we study different specifications of the political model, both in
terms of possible voting strategies (open-loop, subgame perfect, and markov per-
fect) and in terms of the persistence of the chosen policy (persistent vs. reversible).
Our aim is to understand by what type of policies capital market frictions can be
sustained. We show that capital market frictions are politically sustained when
redistributive effects are strong, only and only if persistent frictions can be estab-
lished.
As usual in political economy models, one may wonder why economically
suboptimal outcomes cannot be resolved by bargaining. Shouldn’t it be possi-
ble to compensate the old workers for allowing capital reallocation? Prohibiting
this type of efficient bargaining is the hold-up problem associated with the relin-
quishment of power, a core issue in political economy and the source of much
12
Introduction
inefficiency (Acemoglu, 2003).
1.3 Future Research
Chapter 2 (Incentive-Compatible Sovereign Debt) is the starting point of an ex-
tensive theoretical and empirical research agenda in sovereign debt. Empirically,
the cross-sectional implications of the model must be subjected to rigorous statis-
tical testing. Do shifts in political power or ultimate holdings of sovereign debt
lead to the secondary price responses that the model predicts? Recent events in
the European Union suggest that they do, as shifts in political power were con-
sistently followed by secondary market responses. Theoretically, the framework
must be extended to develop a fully dynamic model of sovereign debt; a model
that endogenizes the cost of repudiation and allows the study of repayment and
refinancing decisions in one unifying framework.
Chapter 3 (Collective Pension Funds) explores one rationale for prefunded
pension funds; future work must include others. In particular, I’ve abstracted
from intergenerational risk-sharing between non-overlapping generations. It is an
important open question whether such risk-sharing is best achieved via govern-
ment debt and tax policies, as in ?, or via pension funds, as in Gollier (2008). The
current framework can be extended to study both in a dynamic OLG setting and
compare, by calibration, the performance of different pension schemes.
Chapter 4 (Sand in the Wheels of Capitalism) predicts that opposition to free
capital markets is strongest in democracies with narrow capital market partici-
pation, and with older populations. Broad capital market participation is found
in some democracies, in particular those with funded pension schemes. Empir-
ical tests must show if capital reallocation is less restricted in democracies with
fully funded pension systems. Ageing populations form another testing ground
for our theory. Empirical tests must show if capital reallocation is more restricted
in democracies with older populations. Finally, as noted, capital market frictions
cannot be bargained away. By broadening capital market participation, however,
capitalists could change the young worker’s preference. This is a possible ex-
tension of the theory reminiscent of Rajan (2010), who argues persuasively that
credit expansion has historically been used to assuage the concerns of a group that
13
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is left behind.
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Chapter 2
Incentive-Compatible Sovereign
Debt1
Abstract. In a model of sovereign borrowing and lending—a model with asym-
metric information, costly state disclosure, and no court to enforce repayment—I
show that a sovereign borrower optimally issues a contract that specifies (i) a fixed
payment, or face value, in high income states, and (ii) a default if the sovereign’s
willingness-to-pay falls short of the face value, where (iii) default is partial rather
than complete, and (iv) the default repayment depends on the power that creditors
have to punish repudiation. The result explains why sovereign borrowers issue
simple debt instruments instead of more contingent contracts. An increase in the
costs of repudiation lowers the interest rate on sovereign debt through a commit-
ment effect: higher costs of repudiation, both political an economic, commit the
sovereign to repay the debt at face value in more states of the world; thus, reducing
sovereign risk.
1I am indebted to Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Enrico Perotti, and Enrique Schroth for their
advice. I thank Adriano Rampini, Andras Niedermayer, André Stenzel, Arnoud Boot, Ernst
Maug, John Moore, József Sákovics, Knut Heen, Klaus Adam, Malin Arve, Mike Burkart, Nico-
las Schutz, Petra Loerke, Philipp Zahn, and seminar audiences at the Stockholm School of Eco-
nomics, the University of Vienna, the University of Edinburgh, and Copenhagen Business School
for comments.
Incentive-Compatible Sovereign Debt
2.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses credit extension to a borrower in the absence of a court.
Creditors can punish repudiation by the borrower, but they cannot seize any of
the borrower’s income. The borrower is also better informed as to her income.
Creditors can get informed if the borrower agrees to a public audit, which is costly.
The problem occurs naturally in sovereign borrowing. Sovereign debt contracts
have been shown to be hard to enforce, not least because governments have private
information, and are reluctant to subject to a public audit of their books by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), or fellow member states. In this chapter, I
adopt a simple model of sovereign borrowing and lending to answer the following
question: if a government seeks to finance an expenditure today, but receives
income only in the future, what is the optimal financial contract the government
can offer to international creditors?
In an Arrow-Debreu world, with complete contingent contracts, the question
is easily answered: the optimal contract is either indeterminate or the optimal
contract doesn’t exist–depending on whether expected income exceeds the ex-
penditure. The market for sovereign finance, by contrast, is plagued by at least
two frictions. First, there is an enforcement friction: there is little collateral,
and seizure of sovereign assets is complicated.2 It follows that a sovereign bor-
rower can repudiate any contract she has entered and repay zero to her creditors;
this is known as the willingness-to-pay problem. Why a sovereign borrower ever
chooses repayment over repudiation, in the absence of a court, is a central ques-
tion of the sovereign debt literature. The sovereign pays for two reasons in this
chapter. First, the sovereign pays because she is concerned with the economic
costs of repudiation. In line with the literature on the willingness-to-pay prob-
lem, I assume that repudiation is economically costly.3 Second, and novel to my
2Domestic courts are subject to the laws of the sovereign and, therefore, cannot be used to force
the sovereign to repay. As for outside courts, there are few assets located abroad, and those that
are located abroad are often protected by sovereign immunity, cf. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(cf. 2006).
3In a seminal contribution, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) show that reputational concerns can
sustain positive repayment by the sovereign; other papers that show how positive repayment can
be sustained, in the absence of a court, include Grossman and Van Huyck (1988), Bulow and
Rogoff (1989a,b), Worrall (1990), Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990), Atkeson (1991), Cole and
18
Incentive-Compatible Sovereign Debt
model, the sovereign pays because she is concerned with the political costs of
repudiation: the sovereign is forced to resign if she repudiates.4
Aside from the enforcement friction, there is an information friction: the
sovereign has private information about her income, or ability-to-pay. The sovereign
can disclose her true ability-to-pay to the creditors, but this is costly: the govern-
ment has to invite an outside auditor, like the IMF, and dislikes the increased
scrutiny and interference that follow a public audit. Building on the enforcement
friction and the information friction, I propose a new theory of sovereign debt to
explain why sovereign borrowers issue simple debt instruments instead of more
contingent contracts
The optimal contract specifies (i) a fixed payment, or face value, in unaudited
states; (ii) a payment equal to the creditor punishment threat in audited states; and
(iii) an audit if and only if the sovereign’s willingness-to-pay falls short of the
face value The intuition for the optimal contract is that it economises on costly
auditing, which is what the costly state verification literature has emphasised (cf.
Townsend, 1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985). Compared to the familiar standard
debt contract, there is still a fixed payment in high-income states, i.e., the op-
timal contract is still a debt contract. But the optimal contract specifies partial
repayment for audited states, rather than full repayment (or maximum recovery);
in addition, the usual budget constraint is replaced by a willingness-to-pay con-
straint.
It is natural to interpret a public audit as a sovereign default episode. Examples
abound: Russia defaulted in 1998, Pakistan in 1999, Argentina in 2001. Indeed,
default episodes are politically costly to governments who are likely to lose office,
as Borensztein and Panizza (2009) document. Default episodes also involve a
transfer of information: more information comes available through, e.g., IMF
reports and increased press coverage.5
Kehoe (1998), Kletzer and Wright (2000), Sandleris (2008), Guembel and Sussman (2009), and
Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009). Eaton and Fernandez (1995) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
survey the literature.
4The political cost is best thought of as a punishment by the electorate for the economic hard-
ship suffered. Indeed, governments are often forced to resign in the wake of a default, as Ar-
gentina’s government was in 2001. See Blustein (2005) for a detailed account.
5The 2010 debt crisis in Greece serves as a case in point: details on its tax-collection system,
and the size of its public sector entitlements, became widely known after the EU-IMF-ECB bailout.
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With the default interpretation, the characteristics of the optimal contract match
some key facts of sovereign borrowing: first, the sovereign’s default decision de-
pends on her willingness-to-pay, rather than on her solvency;6 second, default
is partial rather than complete, and creditors get a haircut that depends on their
power;7 and third, countries issue plain bonds that promise a fixed payment.8
A further result is that an increase in the political cost of repudiation can in-
crease welfare by alleviating the inefficiency due to the enforcement friction. High
repudiation costs work as a commitment to repay in the absence of formal outside
enforcement: the government is committed to repay the debt at face value in more
states of the world.
In section 2.5, I extend the basic model to study the role of creditor coordina-
tion costs, along the lines of Bolton and Jeanne (2009). Clearly, creditor coordi-
nation is an important issue in sovereign debt renegotiations. If creditors cannot
coordinate around a debt renegotiation, then such renegotiation breaks down, lead-
ing to a deadweight loss. Bolton and Jeanne (2007, 2009) take this observation to
an extreme by assuming that sovereign debt can either be renegotiated at no cost,
or not at all. I show that the debt contracts that are available to the sovereign by as-
sumption in Bolton and Jeanne (2007, 2009), can be derived as optimal contracts:
non-renegotiable debt is the optimal contract if an audit and creditor coordination
are both costly; renegotiable debt is optimal if an audit is costly, but subsequent
creditor coordination is costless
This chapter is related to theories of debt in the corporate finance literature,
in particular to the costly state verification models pioneered by Townsend (1979)
and Gale and Hellwig (1985).9 My approach is new in combining the well-known
Greece, however, has not defaulted on its creditors at the time of writing. In light of the model in
section 3.2, Greece has chosen to be audited, but has not yet made its repayment decision.
6Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document a wide dispersion of debt-to-GDP levels at time of
default, and argue that a sovereign’s willingness-to-pay, rather than her ability-to-pay, determines
the repayment decision.
7All creditors are not equal. As there is no court to enforce creditor priority, creditors can
expect to be repaid according to the power they wield. The IMF, for example, is typically repaid
in full, whereas private creditors receive a haircut.
8All parties involved understand that plain bonds are, implicitly, contingent on the state of
the world. Still, the prevalence of plain bonds, instead of more explicitly contingent contracts,
in sovereign borrowing is puzzling, as Borensztein and Mauro (2004) and Shleifer (2003) have
argued.
9Other papers that study optimal contracting under costly state verification are Border and
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costly state verification approach with an ex-post repayment decision, i.e. with the
willingness-to-pay problem. A second innovation is that the audit cost is political:
the sovereign dislikes to disclose its true ability-to-pay. The political reluctance
to disclose, the political cost of repudiation, and the economic cost of repudiation
drive the optimal contract design.
Conceptually, this chapter is close to Gale and Hellwig (1989) who consider a
model of sovereign borrowing with asymmetric information and a willingness-to-
pay problem. But Gale and Hellwig (1989) study the outcome of the ex-post debt
renegotiation; they are not concerned with the ex-ante optimal contract design as
I am here.10
Finally, this chapter is related to Bolton and Jeanne (2007, 2009) who ar-
gue that the sovereign debt market–left to itself–produces equilibria in which
the sovereign debt structure is excessively hard to restructure. In both papers
the sovereign, by assumption, can issue two types of debt: debt that is renego-
tiable (r-debt), and debt that is not renegotiable (n-debt). If the government is
truly unable to repay, renegotiable debt allows for an efficient renegotiation of
the debt burden, while non-renegotiable debt leads to a dead-weight loss. Still,
the sovereign may choose to issue non-renegotiable debt because it offers some
commitment value: n-debt strengthens the sovereign’s repayment incentives in
Bolton and Jeanne (2007), and n-debt cannot be diluted by subsequent debt is-
sues in Bolton and Jeanne (2009). In this chapter, both renegotiable debt and
non-renegotiable debt emerge as optimal contracts, see section 2.5.
Sobel (1987); Mookherjee and Png (1989); Krasa and Villamil (1994, 2000); Hvide and Leite
(2010). Other papers that show the optimality of debt under some form of enforceability include
Diamond (1984), Innes (1990), and Hart and Moore (1998).
10Specifically, Gale and Hellwig (1989) model debt renegotiation under asymmetric information
as a signalling game: first the borrower decides how much to repay, then the creditors choose
whether to accept the payment or punish the borrower and seize some output. As creditors can
always use their punishment technology, the initial contract does not matter in Gale and Hellwig
(1989). By contrast, in this chapter creditors can only punish the sovereign debtor if there is a
breach of contract and output cannot be seized.
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2.2 Model: A Simple Borrowing Problem
Consider a small open economy over two periods: the present (t = 0) and the
future (t = 1). There is a single homogeneous good that can be consumed or
invested. A sovereign government, or sovereign, seeks to finance a fixed gov-
ernment expenditure, g > 0, at time 0; the government expenditure benefits all
residents in the economy equally.11 As the sovereign has no funds at time 0, she
seeks to raise the full amount from international creditors, in return for a promise
to repay at date 1. A continuum of risk-neutral creditors provides funds at the
prevailing opportunity cost of capital, normalised to 0. The sovereign seeks to
borrow from a mass one subset of the creditors.
The sovereign’s budget at date 1 is uncertain as of date 0. Budget uncertainty
arises because future output is uncertain, as is the sovereign’s ability to tax output,
cut expenses, or generate income from other sources, e.g., from privatising state
property, or undertaking structural reforms. The sovereign’s budget, or ability-to-
pay, is denoted by y, a random variable that takes values in an interval T ⊆ R+
and is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F(y).
Two frictions limit the efficiency of sovereign borrowing. The first friction
arises from asymmetric information: while the sovereign observes y at no cost,
outside creditors only observe y if the sovereign subjects to a public audit. If there
is a public audit, the country comes under international public scrutiny, led by the
IMF, and creditors learn about the sovereign’s ability-to-pay. The public audit is
costly to the sovereign: the sovereign faces interference with her policies and, as
a result of increased transparency, possibly loses office.
The second friction arises from the lack of enforcement in the sovereign fi-
nance market: a sovereign borrower can repudiate any contract and repay 0. In
line with the literature on the willingness-to-pay problem, I assume that repudia-
tion is economically costly. This cost should be thought of as arising, either, from
direct creditor sanctions, as in Sachs and Cohen (1982); or, from a loss of market
access, as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
The sovereign maximises the utility of the representative resident, and enjoys
11The government expenditure can be thought of as public consumption, as the expenditure
does not raise future productivity of the economy. This assumption is not crucial for any of my
results, but plausible in the context of sovereign borrowing, cf. also Bolton and Jeanne (2009).
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a private benefit from holding office. The utility of the sovereign is given by
US = χgV + c+S(y, yˆ) (2.2.1)
where the first two terms capture the utility of the representative resident: χg is an
indicator that equals 1 if the expenditure is financed; V represents the utility value
the residents derive from the expenditure at date 0; and c is consumption at date
1, i.e. income net of any repayment to creditors, or punishment for repudiation.
The third term, S(y, yˆ) ≥ 0, is a non-pecuniary private of holding office, which is
enjoyed depending on the sovereign’s announcement and repayment decision at
date 1. The sovereign enjoys the biggest private benefit if she repays without a
public audit; she enjoys a smaller private benefit if she repays after a public audit;
finally, she enjoys no private benefit if she repudiates–repudiation is costly, and so
is a public audit. This is represented by a step-function
S(y, yˆ) = Bχ{noaudit,repayment}(y, yˆ)+bχ{audit,repayment}(y, yˆ)
where χ is an indicator function, B> 0, and 0< b≤ B.
In autarky, residents consume y as it comes available and the sovereign enjoys
her full private benefit from holding office; her expected utility at date 0 is
EUautS = Ey+B (2.2.2)
I assume that financing the government expenditure is efficient, g < V , and that
the sovereign’s expected income exceeds the expenditure, Ey> g. These assump-
tions ensure, first, that the sovereign wants to finance the expenditure expenditure
and, second, that the sovereign is able to finance the expenditure if information is
symmetric and enforcement is complete–i.e. in a first-best world. The sovereign’s
first-best expected utility is given by
EUFBS =V +Ey−g+B (2.2.3)
Any contract that satisfies the budget constraint and, in expectation, pays out g to
creditors implements the first-best allocation.
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With asymmetric information and no formal outside enforcement–i.e. in a
second-best world–the interaction between the sovereign and international cred-
itors is as follows. At date 0, the financing stage, the sovereign seeks to finance
the expenditure by offering a contract to creditors. The contract determines (i) the
sovereign’s contractual payment obligation in each state; and (ii) what states are to
be audited. Formally, a contract is defined as an array (O1, Id), where O1 =O1(y)
gives the date 1 contractual obligation as a function of the budget, and Id = Id(y) is
an indicator that equals 1 if there is an audit, 0 otherwise. At date 1, the repayment
stage, the sequence of actions is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the state y, sovereign observes y ;
2. Announcement: Sovereign announces her ability-to-pay yˆ,
(a) if Id(yˆ) = 1, then creditors observe y, and the contractual obligation is
O1(y);
(b) if Id(yˆ) = 0, then the contractual obligation is O1(yˆ).
3. Payment: Sovereign makes a repayment decision r ∈ {0,1},
(a) r = 1: she pays O1, i.e. honours the contract, and the games ends, or
(b) r = 0: she pays 0, i.e. repudiates, and creditors charge a punishment.
The contractual obligation of the sovereign is fully determined by her announce-
ment at the repayment stage. If the sovereign announces a state for which the
contract specifies an audit, then creditors observe the budget and the contractual
obligation is set at O1(y). If instead the sovereign announces a state that remains
unaudited, then based on the announcement the contractual obligation is set at
O1(yˆ). Finally, the sovereign makes her payment decision: she can either repudi-
ate the contractual obligation she entered, or honour it. An outside arbitrator, with
the same information as creditors, certifies whether the sovereign has honoured
or repudiated her contractual obligation.12 If the sovereign honours the contract,
12The IMF plays an important role in sovereign default episodes and subsequent debt renegoti-
ations. For example, an IMF program is prerequisite to a renegotiation of any Paris club debt (i.e.
debt owed to creditor nations). Furthermore, IMF data form the basis for debt renegotiations with
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then investors have no further claim against her. If, instead, the sovereign repu-
diates the contract, there is a proportional output loss, γy, as in Sachs and Cohen
(1982) and Bolton and Jeanne (2009). Creditors do not recover any payment if the
sovereign repudiates; thus, the output loss represents a deadweight loss.13 Note
that the sovereign’s repayment decision depends on the true budget, y, as well as
on the contractual obligation, O1(yˆ). The sovereign’s payoff is summarised in the
following table:
To conclude the section, consider the different entries in table 2.2.1. All en-
tries but the lower-left (no audit, repayment), correspond to a sovereign default
episode; and all default episodes are politically costly to the sovereign. Still, not
all default episodes are equal. If there is a public audit and the sovereign subse-
quently repays, the outcome resembles a successful debt workout, or an excusable
default as in Grossman and Van Huyck (1988). If the sovereign repudiates, there
is an output loss of γy, but creditors do not recover any payment.14
the private sector; sometimes, the IMF even provides an explicit seal of approval for a proposed
debt restructuring by sending comfort letters to creditors, cf. Díaz-Cassou, Erce, and Vázquez-
Zamora (2008). While the IMF performs the role of an auditor, the IMF crucially cannot enforce
payments or seize assets.
13The output loss is best thought of as arising from a loss of market access: as long as no set-
tlement is reached with outside investors, the country is shut out off international markets (Bolton
and Jeanne, 2009); the parameter γ ≤ 1 captures the power of creditors to punish the sovereign for
repudiation.
14Outright repudiation is rarely observed. An example is the refusal of Russia’s Bolshevik
government to repay Tsarist debts after the revolution in 1918.
Repayment Repudiation
Audit y−O1(y) y− γy
No Audit y−O1(yˆ)+B1 y− γy
Table 2.2.1: Sovereign’s Payoff Matrix
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2.3 Optimal contract
2.3.1 With repayment commitment
The optimal contract depends on whether the sovereign can commit to a future
repayment strategy at the financing stage. As a benchmark, I derive the optimal
contract assuming that the sovereign can commit, at date 0, to a future repayment
strategy, at date 1. In the following, let y be the true state, while yˆ denotes the
announced state. Under commitment, the sovereign chooses full-repayment, i.e.
a repayment strategy given by
r(y, yˆ) =

1 if O1(y) ≤ y and Id(yˆ) = 1,
1 if O1(yˆ) ≤ y and Id(yˆ) = 0,
0 if otherwise
With full repayment, the sovereign pays any contractual obligation that respects
the budget constraint. The remaining problem is to derive the optimal contract
under a full-repayment commitment; a problem that is equivalent to a special case
of Gale and Hellwig (1985), who consider a model of credit extension without
any enforcement friction.
If there is an optimal contract, it takes the form of a standard debt contract.
Three features define standard debt: (i) a fixed payment, or face value; (ii) an
audit if and only if the sovereign’s ability-to-pay falls short of debt’s face value;
and (iii) maximum recovery in case of an audit.15 Formally, a contract (O1, Id) is
said to be a standard debt contract if and only if
1. for some D, we have O1(y) = D if Id(y) = 0 ;
2. Id(y) = 1 if and only if y< D ; and
3. O1(y) = y if Id(y) = 1 ;
also see figure 2.3.1.
15As there is only a private cost of disclosure, maximum recovery implies that all income is
transferred to creditors in case of disclosure. By contrast, the pecuniary costs of state observa-
tion in Gale and Hellwig (1985) imply that creditors recover only part of firm income in case of
disclosure.
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y
O1 ability to pay
0 D
D(g)
Figure 2.3.1: Payment of standard debt contract as a function of income.
2.3.2 Without repayment commitment
Without the ability to commit, the sovereign makes her repayment decision after
the contractual obligation is set. To see which contractual obligations are repaid,
and which are repudiated, consider the repayment stage at time 1. The optimal
repayment strategy, r(y, yˆ), follows from comparing the sovereign’s utility in case
of repayment with her utility in case of repudiation; it is given by
r(y, yˆ) =

1 if O1(y) ≤ min{γy+b,y} and Id(yˆ) = 1,
1 if O1(yˆ) ≤ min{γy+B,y} and Id(yˆ) = 0,
0 if otherwise
(2.3.1)
The maximum contractual obligation that is repaid under the optimal repayment
strategy, by definition, is the sovereign’s willingness-to-pay; it depends both on
the true state and the announced state, and is increasing in the costs of repudiation–
the economic costγ , and the political cost B.
Repudiation leads to a deadweight loss, as creditors do not recover any pay-
ment if the sovereign repudiates. Contracts that are repaid almost surely at the
repayment stage are called repudiation-proof. Formally, a contract, (O1, Id), is
said to be repudiation proof if and only if:
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P({y ∈ T | yˆ(y) is such that r(y, yˆ(y)) = 0}) = 0
were yˆ(y) is the sovereign’s chosen announcement in state y under the given con-
tract. Repudiation proofness is necessary for optimality, as the following proposi-
tion shows.
Proposition 2.3.1. An optimal contract must be repudiation-proof.
Proof. Consider an optimal contract, (O1, Id) and suppose it is not repudiation-
proof. Then consider a new contract,(O˜1, I˜d), given by
O˜1(y) =

min{γy+b,y} for{y ∈ T | yˆ(y) such that Id = 1 and r = 0}
min{γy+B,y} for{y ∈ T | yˆ(y) such that Id = 0 and r = 0}
O1(y) for{y ∈ T | yˆ(y) such that r = 1}
and I˜d ≡ Id . Note that the new contract is repudiation-proof by construction, and
leaves the sovereign with identical announcement incentives. It follows that, un-
der the new contract, the sovereign receives the same payoff in all states, while
creditors receive a higher expected payment, which contradicts the optimality of
the initial contract.
The proposition is intuitive: an optimal contract avoids the deadweight loss
of repudiation by respecting the sovereign’s willingness-to-pay constraints. Note
that the standard debt contract is, in general, not repudiation-proof.16
At the announcement stage, the sovereign can lie about her income; she will if
lying leads to a lower repayment. I check that the the contract, (O1, Id), is carried
out as specified. If the announcement is such that the contract calls for an audit
(i.e. Id(yˆ) = 1), then creditors observe the true state, and the contractual obligation
is set atO1(y); thus, I need only check that the sovereign has no incentive to falsely
claim that her income is yˆ, with Id(yˆ) = 0.
LetW (y, yˆ) denote the sovereign’s date 1 payoff if her true income is y, while
16Under standard debt, the contractual obligation exceeds the sovereign’s willingness-to-pay
with positive probability, except for γ = 1.
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she announces yˆ for which Id(yˆ) = 0, so
W (y, yˆ) := y−O1(yˆ)+B
If the sovereign reveals the true state y, her date 1 utility is
y−O1(y)+S(y,y)
A contract then is said to satisfy truthful state revelation if and only if: for any
states y and yˆ such that Id(yˆ) = 0, we haveW (y, yˆ)≤ y−O1(y)+S(y,y). Announc-
ing a false state is unprofitable if a contract satisfies truthful state revelation; the
structure imposed is given in the following lemma.
Proposition 2.3.2. A contract (O1, Id) satisfies truthful state revelation if and only
if there is a constant D such that (i) O1(y) = D, whenever Id(y) = 0; and (ii) for
any y and yˆ such that Id(yˆ) = 0, Id(y) = 1, we have O1(y)≤ O1(yˆ)− (B−b).
Proof. If (i) and (ii) hold, the sovereign cannot do better than truthfully reveal her
income at the announcement stage. To see that (i) and (ii) are necessary, suppose
O1(y) is not constant for unaudited states; then, the sovereign has an incentive to
announce the unaudited state that results in the lowest repayment, contradicting
truthful state revelation. Likewise, suppose condition (ii) is violated; then, there
exists y and yˆ with Id(yˆ) = 0 and Id(y) = 1, such that O1(y) > O1(yˆ)− (B− b).
This implies that the sovereign strictly prefers to announces yˆ instead of y, again
a contradiction.
Condition (i) of the lemma ensures that the sovereign has no gain from an-
nouncing a different state if the actual realisation remains unaudited. Condition
(ii) of the lemma ensures that the sovereign has no gain from announcing an unau-
dited state if the actual realisation calls for an audit. She may be tempted to do so
to avert the loss of private benefit that is associated with an audit, i.e., to avert the
loss of (B−b).
An optimal contract, (O1, Id), solves
max
(O1,Id)
E (y+S(y, yˆ))−g
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such that
EO1(y)≥ g (2.3.2)
and
O1(y) ≤ min{γy+B,y} for y ∈ {x|Id(x) = 0} (2.3.3)
O1(y) ≤ min{γy+b,y} for y ∈ {x|Id(x) = 1} (2.3.4)
and there is a constant D such that
O1(y) = D fory ∈ {x|Id(x) = 0} (2.3.5)
O1(y) ≤ D− (B−b) for y ∈ {x|Id(x) = 1} (2.3.6)
An optimal contract maximises the sovereign’s expected utility subject to the
investor participation constraint and four incentive constraints: two repudiation
proofness constraints, and two truthful revelation constraints. It is easy to show
that the participation constraint of the investor must bind at an optimum, or EO1 =
g.17 The maximisation problem reveals that the sovereign wishes to finance the
government expenditure, while maximising the private benefit of holding office.
To characterise the solution, I introduce a new type of contract: the sovereign debt
contract. A contract is said to be a sovereign debt contract if and only if
(i) for some D, we have O1(y) = D if Id(y) = 0 ;
(ii) Id(y) = 1 if and only if D>min{γy+B,y} ; and
(iii) O1(y) = γy+b if Id(y) = 1.
The sovereign debt contract specifies: (i) a fixed payment, or face value; (ii)
disclosure if and only if the willingness-to-pay falls short of the face value; and
(iii) a payment equal to the remaining creditor punishment threat in case of dis-
closure, also see figure 2.3.2.18 Sovereign debt contracts are repudiation-proof,
they satisfy truthful state revelation, and they are uniquely characterised by their
face value. The following proposition shows that an optimal contract must be a
17If the participation constraint does not bind, then P1(y) can be decreased such that the par-
ticipation constraint of the investor, and truthful state revelation, remain satisfied. The resulting
increase in expected utility for the sovereign, contradicts optimality.
18In the graph shown, the political cost of auditing equals the political cost of repudiation, its
upper bound.
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sovereign debt contract.
Proposition 2.3.3. Let (O1, Id) be an optimal contract, then (O1, Id) is a sovereign
debt contract.
Proof. See the Appendix.
y
O1
γy+B
ability to pay
D−B
γ
0
D(g,γ,B)
B
Figure 2.3.2: Payment of sovereign debt contract as a function of income
Intuitively, the sovereign debt contract is optimal because it (i) economises on
the costs of auditing, and (ii) is never repudiated. While costly audits serve to es-
tablish the sovereign’s ability-to-pay, repudiation leads to a pure deadweight loss.
The sovereign debt contract is repaid at face value in high income states, where
the sovereign’s willingness-to-pay is also high; in low income states, where the
sovereign’s willingness-to-pay is also low, the sovereign debt contract specifies a
public audit and an output-contingent payment.
Compared to standard debt, the fixed repayment feature is retained in the
sovereign debt contract. The audit decision differs; in particular, there is an audit
whenever the willingness-to-pay of the sovereign falls below a threshold. Finally,
the sovereign debt contract does not specify maximum recovery for states that are
audited. Rather, the amount that is recovered in audit states equals the punishment
that creditors can inflict. For the boundary case, γ = 1, the sovereign debt contract
coincides with standard debt. The intuition is that the willingness-to-pay problem
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poses no constraint if repudiation leads to a loss of the full budget. For the more
plausible cases, with γ < 1, the payment of the sovereign debt contract is discon-
tinuous at the audit threshold, i.e., at y= D−Bγ . The payment discontinuity ensures
that the sovereign reveals her budget truthfully in all states.
The primitives of the contracting problem are (i) the private benefits of holding
office, B and b (ii) the proportion of output that is lost if the sovereign repudiates,
γ (iii) the government expenditure need g, and (iv) the distribution and support
of income y, i.e. F(y) and T ⊆ R+. To gain intuition for the existence problem,
consider the contracting problem under symmetric information. With symmetric
information, the only remaining friction is the willingness-to-pay problem and the
scope for inefficiency is extreme: either the expenditure can be financed and the
first-best is achieved, or there is no contract with which the expenditure can be
financed. To see this, note that with symmetric information there is no need for
costly auditing, and the sovereign can pledge a maximum of γy+B in each state,
as long as the budget constraint is satisfied. Expected pledgeable income therefore
equals
E (min{γy+B,y}) (2.3.7)
If pledgeable income exceeds the expenditure (g), then the first-best can be achieved
and the optimal contract is indeterminate; if the expenditure exceeds pledgeable
income, then no contract allows the sovereign to finance the expenditure. The ex-
ample shows that the primitives of the problem can be such that the sovereign is
not able to finance the expenditure with any contract. In particular this is the case
if creditors have little power to punish repudiation (γ ' 1), or if the government
expenditure is high (g( 0).
2.4 Sovereign Debt Contract
An individual investor who holds a sovereign debt contract, (O1, Id), expects a
repayment of
EO1 = γ
D−B/γˆ
0
y f (y)dy+D
∞ˆ
D−B/γ
f (y)dy (2.4.1)
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Simple comparative statics show that
Proposition 2.4.1. The expected repayment of a sovereign debt contract with a
given face value D, is increasing in creditor power, γ , and in the private benefit of
holding office, B.
The proposition is intuitive. An increase in the economic cost of repudiation,
γ , increases the sovereign’s willingness-to-pay in all states. An increase in polit-
ical cost of repudiation, B, also increases the sovereign’s willingness-to-pay, but
only in unaudited states.19
Consider the primary market for sovereign debt, i.e. the market at the date of
issuance. The main question at date 0 is whether the sovereign can finance g. She
can’t if creditors have too little power or if the government expenditure is too high
(cf. section 2.3.2). Proposition 2.4.1 then implies that an increase in Bmay lift the
sovereign out of autarky; likewise, an increase in γ can leave the sovereign debtor
better off. . For the primary market, the model predicts that the sovereign should
find it easier to raise funds from powerful creditors, meaning that the sovereign
pays a lower interest rate on a loan of given size. After the date of issuance,
sovereign debt contracts trade in a secondary market, where their market value
equals expected creditor repayment.20
Different events may move the secondary market price, or implied interest
rate, of the sovereign debt contracts. Suppose, for example, that the government
announces an audit at time 1, cf. timing of events in section 3.2. Then credi-
tors will observe the state of the economy as information on the economy comes
available. This may not be immediate. By contrast any market response will be
immediate. As soon as the government announces the audit, the market value
drops to
E(O1|Id = 1) = γ
D−B/γˆ
0
y f (y)dy
19In disclosed states, the political audit cost is sunk and only the threat of creditor punishment
deters the sovereign from repudiation.
20Formally, there is no secondary market in my model, as investors are homogeneous. Trade
can easily be introduced, however, by assuming exogenous liquidity shocks. That the market
value equals expected repayment follows from investor risk neutrality. It follows from investors’
participation constraint that the market value at date 0 equals g.
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where f (y) is the probability density function. When creditors learn about y, the
market value converges to γy.21
Another event of interest is a change of government before the repayment
stage. Within the framework of the model, there are two channels through which
a change in government can effect the market value of outstanding debt:
1. a change in the private benefit B (willingness-to-pay channel) ; or
2. a change in the distribution, F , and support ,T , of ability-to-pay y (compe-
tence channel) .
Suppose a new government takes office that is understood to be more competent
than its predecessor as to collecting taxes, undertaking structural reforms, and pri-
vatising state property. Then the probability of a high income state increases and
so does the market value of outstanding debt.22 The opposite happens if a new
government takes charge that is perceived to be less competent than its predeces-
sor. Likewise, suppose a government takes over that is known to be highly com-
mitted to avoid a public audit (high B), then the market will view this favourably
and the market value of outstanding debt increases. A new government that is per-
ceived as less committed to pay the debt at face value (low B) leads to a decline in
the market value of outstanding debt.
Finally, one may consider the impact of changes in γ and B in the secondary
market. If changes take place before date 1, then the effect is given by proposition
2.4.1. Hence the market value of the sovereign debt contract increases with an
increase in either γ or B.23
2.5 Alternative Repayment Game
I consider an alternative repayment game, in which a debt crisis is followed by a
debt renegotiation, as in Bolton and Jeanne (2009). In the original formulation,
21Learning about y can, for example, be modelled as a narrowing of the support of y.
22Any market response must run through expectations of investors, as there is not yet a realisa-
tion of y.
23Note that both an increase in γ and an increase in B destroy truthful state revelation of the
contract that was initially issued: the sovereign pays D even in states where the contract calls for
an audit. Indeed, this is the reason why the market value increases.
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there is no need to renegotiate the initial contract, as the contract specifies the
course of action in each contingency. The alternative view, explored here, is that
the contract cannot be explicitly conditioned on the state of the world, even if
creditors observe that state. The repayment game, at time t = 1, is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the state y, sovereign observes y ;
2. Announcement: Sovereign announces her ability-to-pay yˆ,
(a) if Id(yˆ) = 1, investor observes y, and a debt renegotiation starts;
(b) if Id(yˆ) = 0, then contractual obligation is O1(yˆ).
3. In case of a debt renegotiation, coordinated creditors make a repayment
offer η . Otherwise, the contract binds both parties to O1(yˆ).
4. Payment: Sovereign makes a repayment decision r ∈ {0,1},
(a) she pays and the game ends (r = 1), or
(b) she repudiates and creditors charge a punishment (r = 0).
If the sovereign announces a state that is not audited, then the contractual obliga-
tion, O1(yˆ), is binding for all parties. If instead there is an audit, then creditors
make a repayment offer η for which they are willing to swap the initial contract
and lift repudiation sanctions; but, creditors can only make the offer if they man-
age to coordinate. Formally, there is a coordination cost cR, incurred by creditors
if they make an offer η . As the renegotiation surplus equals γy, creditors cannot
be coordinated if the income realisation is too low, or γy < cR. In such states, no
renegotiation takes place, creditors receive 0, and the sovereign suffers the eco-
nomic and political cost of repudiation. If creditors can coordinate, i.e., γy ≥ cR,
then the creditor offer follows from solving the repayment game backwards along
the public audit branch. Because the sovereign accepts any offer η ≤ γy, creditors
set their offer at η = γy, and receive a net payment of γy− cR.
I assume that creditors can either coordinate at no cost (cR = 0); or creditors
cannot coordinate at all (cR = ∞). These assumptions are made to capture, in a
stylised way, the difference between debt that is held by a handful of banks that
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find it easy to coordinate; and debt that is held by dispersed bondholders that
cannot be coordinated, also see Bolton and Jeanne (2009).
If creditors can coordinate at no cost, then introducing the debt renegotia-
tion is equivalent to setting the contractual obligation in audited states equal to
O1(y) = γy in the original specification of the model; thus, the contracting prob-
lem becomes a special case of section 2.3.2: the set of admissible contracts is
restricted.24 By proposition 2.3.3, the optimal contract is a sovereign debt con-
tract; furthermore, a sovereign debt contract is admissible as it satisfiesO1(y) = γy
for audited states. It follows that proposition 2.3.3 applies, so that
Proposition 2.5.1. For cR = 0 and γ = 1, the optimal contract is standard debt
contract; for cR = 0 and γ < 1 the optimal contract is a sovereign debt contract.
Proof. Let cR = 0 and γ = 1 and assume that an optimal contract exists. Then, by
proposition 2.3.3, the optimal contract is a sovereign debt contract. As γ = 1, the
sovereign debt contract coincides with the standard debt contract; If cR = 0 and
γ < 1, and there exists an optimal contract, then the optimal contract is a sovereign
debt contract by proposition 2.3.3.
Proposition 2.5.1 shows that the optimal contract is a sovereign debt contract.
The conditions for the existence of an optimal contract are the same as in section
2.3.2, i.e. g cannot be too big, and γ cannot be too small. Proposition 2.5.1 also
shows that renegotiable debt, as in Bolton and Jeanne (2009), is optimal if creditor
coordination is costless (cR = 0), and if creditor punishment is maximal (γ = 1).
If creditors cannot coordinate at all, then no renegotiation can take place and
an audit leads to the same payoff as repudiation: creditors receive 0; the sovereign
incurs a loss of γy, and loses her private benefit B. In an optimal contract, the
payment to creditors in undisclosed states must compensate for the zero payment
to creditors in all other states.25 Furthermore, the contract must specify a constant
contractual obligation across states. Any other contract leaves the sovereign with
24Stage 3 can be collapsed into Stage 2a of the original repayment game, by setting O1(y) = γy
for audited states (cf. section 3.2).
25Note that this implies that the conditions for existence of an optimal contract are more strin-
gent than before.
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an incentive to announce the state with the lowest contractual obligation and can-
not satisfy truthful revelation. Let D denote the constant contractual obligation, or
face value, of the optimal contract. Then expected payment is given by
EO1 = D
ˆ
{y|D<min{γy+B,y}}
f (y)dy
The sovereign only pays the debt at face value in states where her willingness-to-
pay exceeds the debt’s face value D. If creditor punishment is maximal, or γ = 1,
then the willingness-to-pay of the sovereign equals her ability-to-pay. It follows
that expected repayment is given by
EO1 = D
∞ˆ
D
f (y)dy
and the optimal contract corresponds to non-renegotiable debt as in Bolton and
Jeanne (2009). If creditor punishment is less than maximal, or γ < 1, then the
willingness-to-pay of the sovereign is smaller than her ability-to-pay and repay-
ment is a political decision; expected repayment is
EO1 = D
∞ˆ
D−B
γ
f (y)dy
which corresponds to non-renegotiable debt à la Bolton and Jeanne (2009), but
with a repudiation threshold that depends on creditor power, and on the private
benefit of holding office. The following proposition summarises the discussion
above.
Proposition 2.5.2. For cR = ∞ and γ = 1, the optimal contract corresponds to
non-renegotiable debt; for cR = ∞ and γ < 1 the optimal contract is a non-
renegotiable debt contract with a repudiation threshold of D−Bγ .
Proof. Omitted
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I analyse the problem of credit extension to a a sovereign borrower
given that (i) there is no court, (ii) the sovereign knows better than creditors what
her repayment capacity is, and (iii) disclosure of that information is politically
costly. Recent events in Greece show the relevance of these issues: creditors did
not have accurate information on the state of government finances and sovereign
debt contracts proved difficult to enforce. In this setting, positive repayment is
sustained by an economic and political penalty associated with repudiation; and
by a political penalty associated with disclosure. These three penalties drive the
optimal contract design.
I show that the sovereign borrower optimally issues a contract for which (i)
the repayment profile is flat in high income states; (ii) there’s a state contingent
payment that depends on creditor power in low income states; and (iii) there is an
audit (or disclosure) if the willingness-to-pay falls short of the face value of the
contract.
The intuition for the optimal contract is that it saves on costly auditing, which
is what the corporate finance literature has emphasised. The optimal contract
itself, however, is different from what the corporate finance literature has found:
it is still a debt contract, but the default decision and the repayment in case of
default differ from standard debt due to the willingness-to-pay problem.
The optimal contract I derive explains some of the salient facts of sovereign
borrowing. First, a sovereign’s ability-to-pay is not the relevant constraint when
it comes to repayment. It is the willingness-to-pay that determines repayment,
and the willingness-to-pay depends jointly on the budget, creditor power, and the
private benefit of holding office. Second, the payment to creditors depends on
their power to punish repudiation. The most powerful creditor is the International
Monetary Fund (IMF); historically, the IMF takes priority over all other creditors.
The upshot is that, even if rates on IMF loans are lower than on other loans, IMF
lending is not concessionary. Third, the sovereign chooses to issue plain bonds.
A priori, this is puzzling, as Shleifer (2003) and others have argued. Why don’t
sovereign borrowers issue contracts that condition on future income? Such con-
tracts are not optimal, because the auditing requirements would be prohibitively
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costly.
The current work can be extended and complemented in several directions.
Empirically, the cross-sectional implications of the model should be taken to the
data. In particular, do shifts in political power or ultimate holdings of sovereign
debt lead to the secondary price responses that the model predicts? The theory
can be extended to develop a fully dynamic model of sovereign debt; a model
that endogenizes the cost of repudiation and allows the study of repayment and
refinancing decisions in one framework.
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Chapter 3
Collective Pension Funds1
Credit Constraints and a Conflict over Risk and Contributions
Abstract. This chapter explores one rationale for pension funds. If individuals
face credit constraints, i.e., if markets are incomplete, then a pension fund is able
to improve on welfare by implementing participants’ preferred investment strat-
egy. A pension fund can do this if (i) participation is mandatory and (ii) it has
access to a tax on human wealth. We show that implementation of the optimal
allocation can be achieved through a defined-contribution (DC) pension scheme.
We argue that, after a low stock return, such schemes can run into the same type
of problems as underfunded defined-benefit (DB) schemes.
1This chapter is based on joint work with David Hollanders. For helpful comments, we thank
Lans Bovenberg, Enrico Perotti, Bas Jacobs, and various seminar audiences.
Collective Pension Funds
3.1 Introduction
A pension is a payment stream that people receive upon retirement, i.e., when they
leave the labor force. Rather than leaving it to individuals to save for their retire-
ment, most advanced economies have pension systems in which individuals are
required to participate. Common to such systems is that people contribute in their
active working years, which entitles them to a pension benefit upon retirement.2
But there is considerable variation between countries in how the pension system
operates, how it is financed, and how pension benefits are determined.3
For example, some countries, like Germany, operate pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
pension systems, where the active working population pays for the current retirees.
Other countries, like the Netherlands, operate additional prefunded schemes, in
which people save through pension contributions and receive a pension bene-
fit that is set according to the pension contract. Again, pension contracts differ
between countries. Roughly, one can distinguish between defined-contribution
(DC) type contracts, where the pension benefit depends explicitly on investment
returns (e.g. the famous 401(k) plans in the U.S.), and defined-benefit (DB) type
contracts, where the pension is set according to a formula that may depend on
average pay, years of employment, age at retirement, and other factors (e.g. the
second pillar in the Netherlands).
Prefunded DB pension schemes—as found in the U.S., the Netherlands, and
elsewhere—run into trouble when they are underfunded, i.e., when pension liabil-
ities, which are fixed, exceed pension assets, which may fluctuate; the difference
is called the pension shortfall. Pension shortfalls are an inherent risk—and recur-
ring feature—of funded DB pension schemes.4 When there is a pension shortfall,
there are two ways to restore the pension system’s solvency: pension entitlements
can be cut; or, contributions can be raised.5 While cutting entitlements hurts
2This seems an obvious requirement, but note that the first generation in a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) pension system receives a pension without having paid contributions.
3World Bank (1994) gives a useful categorization of pension systems into three pillars: a state
pension, aimed at poverty reduction, and financed through taxes; an occupational pension, aimed
to maintain the standard of living, and prefunded; and a private pension, allowing for individual
supplements, also prefunded.
4For example, General Motor’s defined-benefit pension plans reported a shortfall of $35 billion
in 2011; this exceeded GM’s market value.
5By cutting entitlements, pension funds decrease their liabilities; by raising contribu-
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older generations the most—as they have accumulated most entitlements—raising
contributions hurts younger generations more and shields retirees from losses.
Clearly, ex-post, generations do not agree over who should pay for the shortfall;
this must be agreed upon, ex ante, in the pension contract.6 By default, and per
definition, DB schemes put the risk of a pension shortfall on the working genera-
tion, implying that contributions must be raised in case of a shortfall. In practice,
this may turn out to be infeasible for political or regulatory reasons: employers
and workers may effectively resist an increase in contributions—which is a tax
an labor—especially during a recession; if regulations require a quick return to
solvency, as they often do, then pension funds may have no option than to cut
entitlements.
To illustrate these issues, consider the Dutch case. After the 2008 credit crisis,
more than half of the pension funds in the Netherlands were designated ‘under-
funded,’ by the Dutch Central Bank. The decline in pension wealth led to contro-
versy over who should pay to restore the solvency of the pension system—Dutch
regulations required a return to solvency within 5 years. ? calculates that the
proposed policy mix of entitlement cuts and raised contributions hurts older gen-
erations the most.
In recognition of the intrinsic tensions in DB pension systems with mismatch
risk, DB pension schemes are being replaced with DC pension schemes, cf. Goud-
zwaard et al. (2009). In this chapter, my aim is to explore one rationale for a DC
pension scheme that has, so far, received little attention in the literature.7 The
rationale we explore is that pension funds exist to lift credit constraints and im-
plement the optimal optimal life-cycle investment strategy of participating gener-
ations.
An important finding of the literature on modern life-cycle investment theory
is that, over their life-cycle, individuals should hold a constant fraction of their
total wealth in risky assets, with the remainder invested in a risk-free asset, cf.
Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992). The upshot is that individuals’ optimal
tions—while keeping entitlements fixed—pension funds increase their assets.
6As ? argues, the controversy over who should pay cannot be resolved ex post ; it requires a
model of optimal ex ante risk sharing.
7The notable exception is Bovenberg et al. (2007) ; Teulings and de Vries (2006) mention but
do not pursue this rationale for pension funds.
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investment strategy depends on their age: the young—who have human capital
as well as financial capital—should invest their financial capital in a riskier man-
ner than retirees—who have only financial capital. With their human capital, the
young are naturally hedged against stock market risk.8 Typically, these models
require the young to take a leveraged position in the stock market, i.e., to borrow
and invest the proceeds in the stock market.9 If the young face credit constraints,
this strategy is infeasible.
It is plausible that the young face credit constraints in private markets, as they
do not have any collateral to offer to lenders.10 If the young are credit constrained,
then pension funds have a role to play: pension funds can implement the young’s
preferred investment strategy by extending them credit; thus, effectively alleviat-
ing the young’s credit constraints.11 There are two reasons why pension funds
are better placed than private sector lenders to extend credit to the young: (i) par-
ticipation is mandatory, reducing the adverse selection problem; and (ii) pension
funds have access to a tax on human wealth, which allows them to enforce repay-
ment. In effect, the pension fund helps to secure the human capital of participants
as collateral, cf. Bovenberg et al. (2007).
Implementation of optimal investment strategies can be achieved by a DC pen-
sion scheme, where participants pay a fixed amount of contributions (e.g. yearly),
and pension funds invest these contributions on behalf of participants. To imple-
ment the optimal strategy of its youngest participants, the pension fund needs to
borrow on their behalf. A pension fund with only young participants would, thus,
have to take a leveraged position in the stock market, i.e., take a short position in
the risk-free asset. By contrast, pension funds with young and older participants
would still take a net long position in the risk-free asset, as older generations
8This finding relies on the assumption that human capital is risk-free. If capital returns and
wages are cointegrated, as ? propose, then the young already hold a risky asset through their
human capital.
9For example, Teulings and de Vries (2006) show that, at the beginning of one’s career, a
generation should borrow five times its yearly wage to invest in equity—similar results can be
found in Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992).
10The young wish to borrow against their human capital to invest in financial capital, but as
? note: ‘human capital alone does not collateralize major loans for reasons of moral hazard and
adverse selection.’
11Bovenberg et al. (2007) provide a review of different rationales for pension funds; the review
discusses alleviation of borrowing constraints as one possible rationale.
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prefer strategies that are less risky.12 Implementation of the optimal investment
strategy can then be interpreted as the young borrowing from other participants at
the risk-free rate, pledging their human capital as collateral.
To demonstrate how pension funds can improve welfare, we present a simple
and stylized model with three overlapping generations of risk-averse individuals:
the young, the middle-aged, and the old. The capital market is equally stylized, it
consists of a risk-free bond and a risky stock; the equity premium is positive. To
focus on the optimal investment decision, we fix the amount of savings in each
period, i.e., we abstract from the labor supply and optimal savings decision, as
in Gollier (2008). Savings then take the form of a per-period endowment, and
the problem is simply to determine the optimal investment strategy of the young
and middle-aged. The old consume their pension benefit, which is endogenous
and depends on past stock returns. After deriving the complete markets bench-
mark, we introduce credit constraints, a form of market incompleteness. Market
incompleteness, in turn, is the main rationale for pension funds.13
3.2 Model
The economy is populated by three overlapping generations, each of unit mass,
called the young (y), themiddle-aged (m), and the old (o). In their active working
years, generations contribute to a pension fund: the young and middle-aged pay a
fixed contribution, s, to a pension fund in each period. In retirement, generations
consume a pension benefit: the old obtain a pension benefit, b, from the pension
fund. The welfare of a generation is measured by its utility in retirement, and we
assume that generations have a CRRA utility function,
u(b) =
b1−φ
1−φ
12One interpretation is the following: the pension fund operates an internal capital market where
the young issue risk-free debt to the old and use the proceeds to invest in equity.
13Market incompleteness due to credit constraints is a key assumption of our analysis; without
credit constraints, there is no rationale to have a pension fund in our model. Credit constraints are
also assumed in related work by ? and Gollier (2008).
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where φ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.14 After retirement, gener-
ations leave the model.
There is a simple capital market consisting of two financial assets: a risk-free
asset, called bond, and a risky asset, called stock. The gross return of the bond
is fixed over time and normalized to 1. The excess stock return is stochastic and
serially uncorrelated over time. We denote the excess stock return in period t
by r˜t—the mnemonic is that random variables are denoted with a tilde, realized
values without. For simplicity, we assume the excess return follows a Bernoulli
distribution: with probability p, the excess return takes the value rh > 0; with
probability 1− p, it takes the value rl < 0. The equity premium is positive,
µ := prh+(1− p)rl > 0 (3.2.1)
Within each period, the timing within each period is as follows: (i) individuals
enter the period with their financial reserve, i.e., financial assets carried from the
last period; (ii) an investment decision is made; (iii) the young and middle-aged
pay their contributions, and the pension fund pays benefits to the old; (iv) returns
materialize.
3.2.1 Complete Markets
As a benchmark, we examine each generation’s optimal investment strategy if
financial markets are complete in the sense that there are no credit constraints.15
At the beginning of each period, the young and middle-aged decide how much to
invest in the stock, and how much to invest in the risk-free bond. The old have no
more decision to make, they simply consume their accumulated retirement wealth.
Let α it denote the monetary investment in the stock by generation i= y,m in period
t.
We define a generation’s retirement wealth at the beginning of period t as
14As usual the utility function is given by u(b) = ln(b) for φ = 1. Following Gollier (2008),
we focus exclusively on individuals’ optimal investment decision, and we abstract from their la-
bor supply and savings decision. Hence contributions, s, are exogenously fixed, and individuals
maximize their expected retirement benefit, b, which is endogenously determined.
15Financial markets are still incomplete in the sense that non-overlapping generations cannot
share risks with each other, cf. ?, ?, and ?.
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the sum of (i) its financial reserve, i.e., the balance of its financial assets, which
we denote by wit ; and (ii) its human capital reserve, i.e., the residual net present
value of future contributions to the pension fund, which we denote by hit for i =
y,m,o. The old generation’s retirement wealth consists only of their financial
reserve, wo; they have exhausted their human capital reserve. By contrast, the
young generation’s retirement wealth consists only of their human capital reserve,
hy; they have no financial reserve. The retirement wealth of the middle aged
generation consists of both a financial reserve and a human capital reserve, wm+
hm.
The dynamic investment problem can now be written as:
max
αyt ,αmt+1
Eu(b˜)
such that
wyt = 0
wmt+1 = α
y
t (1+ r˜t)+(y−αyt )
wot+2 = αmt+1(1+ r˜t+1)+(wmt+1+ y−αmt+1)
b˜ = wot+2
The solution to the investment problem is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2.1. The optimal dynamic investment strategy of each generation
is to invest a constant fraction of retirement wealth in the risky asset, or α it =
a∗
(
wit +hit
)
for i= y,m ; where the optimal fraction is given by
a∗ =
(−rl(1−p)
rhp
) 1
φ −1
rl− rh
(−rl(1−p)
rhp
) 1
φ
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The corresponding expected lifetime utility for a young individual is
Ucm = Eu(b˜)
= δ 2u(h1)
= δ 2u(2s)
with
δ := E (1+a∗r˜)1−φ (3.2.2)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proposition gives the optimal investment decision for the young, the middle-
aged, and the old; the proposition shows that, over their life-cycle, individuals op-
timally hold a constant fraction of their retirement wealth in the risky asset. This
result is well-known from the literature on optimal life-cycle investment, cf. ?, ?,
and Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992). Simple comparative statics show that
optimal investment in the risky asset, a∗, is increasing in the equity premium, µ ,
and decreasing in the coefficient of relative risk aversion, φ .
Note that δ can be interpreted as the gross per-period utility return of investing
optimally in one period. A young individual’s retirement wealth consists entirely
of his human capital reserve, h1 = 2s. In utility terms, each period of optimal
investment yields a gross return of δ ; hence Ucm = δ 2u(2s). Using a first-order
approximation we note that
δ ≈ 1+(1−φ)a∗µ
In financial terms, the corresponding certainty equivalent rate of return, rceq, is
then given by
u
(
h1 (1+ rceq)2
)
= δ 2u(h1)
or
rceq = δ
1
1−φ −1 (3.2.3)
which is increasing in the equity premium, µ , and in the optimal risky asset ex-
posure, a∗. The certainty equivalent excess return, rceq, is the riskless return that
would leave the young as well off as optimally investing their retirement wealth.
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To conclude the description of complete markets, note that implementation
of the optimal investment strategy requires individuals to actively manage their
portfolios: as individuals grow older, their financial portfolio optimally shows a
decrease in risk. The young hold the riskiest portfolio; to obtain their optimal risk
exposure, the young have to take a leveraged position in the risky asset, i.e., they
have to borrow at the risk-free rate and invest the proceeds in the risky asset. In
practice, this strategy is infeasible if the young are credit constrained.
3.2.2 Credit Constraints
In the following, we examine each generation’s optimal investment policy if finan-
cial markets are incomplete in the sense that there are credit constraints. Specif-
ically, we assume that individuals cannot use future contributions as collateral;16
individuals then face a per-period budget constraint that equals their financial re-
serve, α it ≤ wit .
Compared to the complete market benchmark, these additional constraints
lead to a welfare loss. The young, in particular, are affected: they cannot invest
in the risky asset until the next period, as wy. The middle-aged may also run into
credit constraints, depending on the parameters of the model. We obtain a lower
bound for the welfare loss by assuming that only the young are credit constrained,
Proposition 3.2.2. With credit constraints, the maximum expected lifetime utility
for a young individual is
Ucc = Eu(b˜)
= Eu(2s(1+a∗r˜t+1))
= δu(2s)
and the minimum welfare loss due to credit constraints is
(
δ 2−δ)u(2s)
16Without collateral, the market for stock-investment credit breaks down due to adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard problems, cf. Bovenberg et al. (2007) and Constantinides et al. (2002).
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The proposition is intuitive. The minimum welfare loss arises if individuals
face credit constraints when they are young, but invest optimally when they are
middle-aged. The welfare loss equals the opportunity cost of not being able to
invest in the risky asset while young. In utility terms, this opportunity cost is
the utility gross return δ ; in financial terms, the opportunity cost is the certainty
equivalent excess return, rceq, given by (3.2.3).
When markets are incomplete, there is a role for pension funds: they can ex-
tend credit to the young and implement the young’s preferred investment strategy
for them. This is the rationale for pension funds that we examine. There are two
reasons why pension funds are better placed than the private sector to extend credit
to the young: (i) compulsory participation alleviates adverse selection problems;
and (ii) pension funds have access to a tax on human wealth.17
To implement the optimal allocation of participants, pension funds can op-
erate extended generational accounts, a form of generational accounting where
each generation pays contributions into their account; and gets the balance of its
account upon retirement. The difference with strict generational accounts, as in
Teulings and de Vries (2006), is that the pension fund borrows on behalf of the
young. Note that, with extended generational accounts, the pension fund consists
simply of the merged, accounts of the participating generations; its investment
strategy is a weighted average of the strategies of the participating generations.
Consider the pension fund at time t. From proposition 3.2.1, the young want
to invest an amount
αyt = a∗
(
wyt +h
y
t
)
= a∗2s
17Bovenberg at al. (2007) note: ’compulsory participation in collective pension schemes can
alleviate adverse selection and moral hazard when young workers borrow against their human
capital to invest in equity.’
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in the risky asset. Likewise, the middle-aged want to invest an amount
αmt = a∗ (wmt +hmt )
= a∗2y(1+a∗rt−1)
which depends on the stock return in period t−1. It follows that the pension fund
invests a total amount of αyt +αmt = a∗2y(2+a∗rt−1) in stock on behalf of the
young and the middle-aged. Whether the pension funds’ stock investment exceeds
its financial reserve depends (i) on past stock returns, and (ii) the parameters of
the problem. It is possible, in other words, that the pension fund as a whole has
to take a leveraged position in the stock market. The investment strategy of the
pension fund is a weighted average of the preferred strategies of the young and
the old.
The scheme we described above is similar to generational accounting, where
each generation pays contributions into their own account; the account’s invest-
ments are separately administered; and generations get the balance of their ac-
count when they retire. A pension fund then simply consists of the merged, ring-
fenced, savings accounts of its participants. But generational accounting in the
strict sense, as proposed in Teulings and de Vries (2006), does not allow the young
to borrow against their future contributions, i.e., they are still credit constrained.18
We have argued that pension funds, operating within a mandatory DC pension
scheme, can improve on a laissez-faire market allocation by allowing the young to
implement their optimal investment strategy, i.e., by alleviating their credit con-
straints. The lower bound welfare gain of introducing a pension fund is given by
proposition 3.2.2. As long as the pension fund does not need to borrow in financial
markets, the optimal allocation can be interpreted as the young borrowing from
older participants at the risk-free rate, pledging their human capital as collateral.
The pension fund acts to secure the young’s human capital as collateral to facili-
tate trades in its internal capital market. We note that the ability of pension funds
to increase welfare hinges crucially on the assumption that pension funds can col-
lateralize the human capital of participants. This assumption may be problematic,
18Such a pension fund would not improve on welfare in our stylized model. It is motivated by
hyperbolic discounting and sharing of longevity risks in Teulings and de Vries (2006).
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as we discuss in the concluding section.
3.3 Conclusion
We summarize our argument as follows. If the young face credit constraints, i.e.,
if markets are incomplete, then a pension fund is able to improve on welfare by
implementing the young’s preferred investment strategy. A pension fund can do
this because (i) participation is mandatory and (ii) because it has access to a tax
on human wealth. In effect, the pension fund is able to collateralize the human
capital of its participants; in particular, the pension fund is able to collateralize the
human capital of the young. Introducing a pension fund, thus, increases welfare
compared to a situation in which everyone invests for himself.
The welfare increase by the pension fund relies crucially on the credibility of
young’s future contribution policy. In practice, it may be difficult to raise contribu-
tions after a low stock market outcome—and in particular in a recession. Clearly,
the young do not want to raise contributions ex post, and it may be politically
unpalatable to do so in times of recession.19 If ex-post, after a low stock market
outcome, the pension fund cannot collect contributions, then the result is a distri-
butional conflict, similar to those witnessed in underfunded DB pension schemes.
It follows that the DC pension scheme we describe may run into the same prob-
lems as a DB pension scheme with mismatch risk, and that the ex-ante optimal
risk level at the pension fund cannot be separated from the ex post contribution
policy.
Indeed, one interpretation of the distributional conflict in the Netherlands is
that the pension funds—which, de facto, run a combination of DB and DC pension
contracts—took too much risk on behalf of the young, assuming that contributions
could be raised in case of a pension shortfall. When this proved infeasible, the old
realized that they had implicitly lent their capital to the young and wished to see
a return. The young on the other hand, do not wish contributions to be raised.
This ex post distributional conflict leads to an ex ante governance conflict at the
19The young workers face a commitment problem: ex ante they want to pledge human capital
as collateral, but ex post they have no incentive to raise pension contributions.
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pension fund.20 The old wish to limit risk taking such that they are repaid in every
contingency. Alternatively, the old may agree to letting the young take a high risk
if pension contributions can indeed be raised ex post.
Several important caveats apply. First of all, we’ve abstracted from the labor-
supply and from the savings-consumption decision of individuals to focus on the
optimal investment decision. This is, of course, restrictive. For example, credit
constrained individuals would save more to compensate for the lack in risk taking
opportunities; thus the pension fund becomes less important.
In this chapter I focus exclusively on the preferred risk exposure of participants
as a determinant of the investment strategy of a pension fund. Bikker, Broeders,
Hollanders, and Ponds (2009) provide evidence that indeed age composition is an
important determinant of a pension fund’s asset allocation. But there may be oth-
ers. For example, we have abstracted from agency problems that may be present
at the pension fund. Reward systems may favor risky investment, as portfolio
managers gain from profits but are sheltered from losses.
Regarding the conceptual framework, our simple, stylized, model allows us to
explore one rationale for pension funds. We show that a pension fund may be able
to improve the welfare of credit constrained participants by letting them borrow
within the pension fund. Our analysis could be extended to have an additional
rationale for pension funds: to smooth risks between non-overlapping generations,
as in Gollier (2008). In theory, this is an important benefit that pension funds
can achieve. In practice, however, regulations—like the Dutch requirement to
restore solvency within 5 years—inhibit such risk sharing. Furthermore, from a
theory point of view, it is an open question how optimal risk sharing between
non-overlapping generations is best achieved: through government policy (debt
and tax) or through funded pension schemes. ? present a stylized model in which
optimal risk-sharing is achieved through both.
20This governance conflict resembles the conflict between debt- and equity holders in a firm
that is close to financial distress Tirole and Dwatripont (1994). The young are, like equity holders,
protected by limited liability, while the old have a claim on the pension fund that is debt-like.
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Chapter 4
Sand in the Wheels of Capitalism1
On the Political Economy of Capital Market Frictions
Abstract. This chapter develops a positive theory of capital market frictions,
arising from a political conflict across different vintages of human capital. Older
workers seek a political alliance to restrict the reallocation of capital between
sectors, as this reduces their productivity and thus wages. Such an alliance is
not feasible in a static framework, but may arise if capital market frictions are
persistent over time. We show that a majority of voters chooses to restrict capital
mobility if wealth is concentrated, and if technological obsolescence is high.
1This chapter is based on joint work with Enrico Perotti and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden. For
helpful comments we thank Philippe Aghion, Per Krusell, Enrique Schroth and seminar audiences
at the ESWC 2010 Congress in Shanghai, and the EEA 2010 Congress in Glasgow.
Sand in the Wheels of Capitalism
4.1 Introduction
Political economists say that capital sets towards the most profitable
trades, and that it rapidly leaves the less profitable non-paying trades. But in
ordinary countries this is a slow process.
(Bagehot, 1873)
In a free market, capital moves naturally towards its most profitable use, leav-
ing less productive activities. In reality, capital is reallocated fast in some coun-
tries, slow in others. Wurgler (2000) provides evidence that industries with better
growth prospects invest more in countries that are more financially developed;
these are also the countries in which declining sectors shrink faster. In a neoclas-
sical economic framework, the financial sector should be functional to the needs
of industry and trade, and these differences are attributed to institutional frictions
in capital markets.
There are clear examples of institutional frictions in capital markets which are
hard to reverse. Bankruptcy law, for instance, defines specific conditions to the
assignment of assets from declining sectors. While in some countries bankruptcy
law is designed to protect financial interests, in others–such as France and Italy–it
explicitly instructs the liquidator to reassign capital in a manner which protects
employment. As another example, state banking or specific financial regulators
may be chosen on a mandate to protect traditional lending. For many years, bank-
ing in the U.S. was restricted to be local, assigning control over credit to estab-
lished interests.
In this chapter, we adopt a political economy approach to explain the emer-
gence and persistence of capital market frictions. In the tradition of classical po-
litical economy, we view the rules on capital reallocation as resulting from the
political process that is shaped by economic interests. In practice, the allocation
of capital across industries is heavily politicized, especially in more democratic
countries. Political intervention may be direct, as when the government provides
emergency loans or acquires companies outright; or indirect, as when the govern-
ment adopts takeover regulations or bankruptcy laws that affect how much capital
is reallocated.
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Our starting insight is that labor is less mobile than capital. Here one should
think of redeployable capital, such as land. While land can easily be redeployed,
it is hard to retrain workers once they have acquired specific human capital. As
human capital risk cannot be fully insured–for moral hazard reasons–workers are
exposed to the risks that are specific to the sector they work in. The result of hu-
man capital specificity is a political conflict between citizens with different vin-
tages of sunk human capital: agents with sector-specific human capital resist the
reallocation of capital to newer sectors, as this leads to a reduction in their wages.
We show that in democracies a majority of the population wants to restrict
capital mobility when the redistributive risk is large. This will be the case if
wealth is concentrated, and if technological obsolescence is high. Young work-
ers are the decisive, or pivotal, group in elections; they do not gain from capital
market frictions immediately, but they would like to limit future capital reallo-
cation, anticipating their old age, when they are less productive. A consumption
smoothing motive then leads young workers’ preferences to be partially aligned
with the preferences of the old workers. Rapid technological change implies that
the productivity gap between young and old workers is bigger, and therefore that
the motive to impede capital reallocation is stronger.
An alliance against capital reallocation is never a political equilibrium when
the capital market friction can be repealed at any time in the future. An alliance
against capital reallocation can arise only if capital market frictions are persistent
over time. So we posit that capital market frictions may occur if they can be
introduced as institutional frictions–as opposed to reversible legislative choices.
4.1.1 Related Literature
Wurgler (2000) provides evidence that capital is reallocated more efficiently in
countries with (i) more developed financial markets, (ii) a higher degree of minor-
ity investor protection, and (iii) a lesser extent of state ownership in the economy.
Countries with deeper financial markets increase investment more in growing in-
dustries, and decrease investment more in declining industries. Our political ex-
planation seeks to explain this pattern by endogenizing the resistance to capital
reallocation.
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This chapter is a contribution to the literature on the political determinants
of financial market regulations and corporate governance, Pagano and Volpin (cf.
2005) or Perotti and von Thadden (2006). This literature emphasizes that the eco-
nomic interests of capital investors can be subordinated to political considerations.
In Pagano and Volpin (2005), labor forms an alliance with inside shareholders, in
the contrast of a corporatist alliance with labor against financial investor’s return.
In Perotti and von Thadden (2006), a majority limits the ability of shareholders to
allocate capital in order to limit risk for other stakeholders. This result arises only
in more unequal societies, as in this chapter. Other related papers include Krusell
and Ríos-Rull (1996) and Saint-Paul (2002), who study the political support for
technological innovation, and labor market flexibility. The capital market plays
no role in these papers, while it is central in this chapter. We offer an alternative
channel to advance stakeholder interests: capital market frictions.
Hassler, Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003) study the political support for
a distortionary welfare state. The welfare state distorts private incentives to invest
in education, which in turn gives rise to a constituency that supports the welfare
state. Hassler et al. (2003) provide an example of how repeated majority voting
in an OLG model can generate persistence in support of an inefficient welfare
policy, we provide another. A key difference in our model is that all constituencies
vote, whereas the young are disenfranchised in Hassler et al. (2003) Another
difference is that our current framework does not allow for dynamic feedback of
political choices through incentives as in Hassler et al. (2003); the composition of
constituencies is fixed in this chapter.
Our approach is close to Azariadis and Galasso (2002), who study the political
support for intergenerational transfers from young to old generations (such as pay-
as-you go pension systems). They show that the young generation, who form
a majority, may choose to set positive transfers if they can expect to receive a
transfer when old. Our approach differs in two important aspects. First, we study
political support for distortionary policies, whereas intergenerational transfers are
efficient in Azariadis and Galasso (2002). Second, the young are a majority in
Azariadis and Galasso (2002), while the outcome of our voting game is more
complex: based on age and wealth differences, we identify four distinct voter
classes, none of which forms a majority. Young workers are decisive because
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their preferences are less extreme than the preferences of other voter classes, not
because of their number.
4.2 Model
We use a repeated two-period overlapping-generations model with an infinite hori-
zon. Production requires capital and labor, and takes place in two sectors: a sector
of young firms that employ the young generation; and a sector of old firms that
employ the old generation. Labor is sector-specific while a fixed supply of capital
can be used by all firms. We ignore capital growth in order to focus on the question
how capital is allocated among different sectors. Time is denoted by subscripts
t = 0,1,2, ...,; the different sectors are denoted by superscripts j = Y,O.
4.2.1 Production
At each time, there is a unit mass of identical firms in the young sector and a unit
mass of identical firms in the old sector. All firms exist for two period; they use a
vintage technology to produce a common consumption good that cannot be stored
or saved. As young firms use the latest technology, they are more productive than
old firms.
Production in each sector is given by a sector-specific productivity factor θ j
and a general production function F ; production in the j-sector is
θ jF(K j,L j), j = Y,O
where K j and L j denote the amounts of capital and labor used in sector j, θO< θY
,and the price of output is normalized to 1. The production function F satisfies
the common conditions, i.e., (i) production is increasing in both factors, at a de-
creasing rate; (ii) capital and labor are complementary factors of production; and
(iii) the Inada conditions are satisfied.2 Firms maximize profits facing competi-
tive factor and output markets. Firms hire workers in competitive segmented labor
2Formally, F satisfies (i) FK ,FL > 0 and FKK ,FLL < 0, (ii) FLK = FKL > 0, and (iii) lim
K→0FK =
lim
L→0FL = ∞, and limK→∞FK = limL→∞FL = 0 .
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markets and sell their output in a competitive output market. Reallocated capital
is subject to a politically determined capital market friction.
Due to human capital specificity, the labor market is segmented: old firms
hire old workers and pay wages wOt ; young firms hire young workers and pay
wages wYt . The capital market has two important features: the cost of last period’s
retained capital is rt , while firms pay an additional cost, ct , if they wish to employ
additional capital this period. The cost ct represents a pure deadweight loss; it
drives a wedge between the interest rate that capitalists receive and the cost of
capital that firms pay. We refer to ct as the capital market friction or, simply the
reallocation cost.
As there are two costs of capital in the economy–one for retained capital and
one for newly obtained capital–a firm’s capital cost depends on the capital stock
at the start of each period. We denote the initial capital stock of j-firms in period
t by Kˆ jt . Profits by firms of age j in period t are then given by
θ jF(K jt ,L
j
t )− rtK jt − ctmax(0,K jt − Kˆ jt )−wjt L jt
This is a standard expression for firm profits, except for the third term. Firms pay
a marginal cost of capital rt + ct , if they want to attract capital beyond the initial
stock of Kˆt
j.
Young firms don’t have retained capital (KˆYt = 0) and must attract all capital
at a unit cost of rt + ct . When young firms turn into old firms–and the young
generation turns into the old generation–they retain last period’s capital (KˆOt =
KYt−1). As old firms are less productive than young firms, there is an economic
rationale for capital reallocation from old to young firms. When old firms go
extinct, the capital they previously employ comes available to use elsewhere.
4.2.2 Agents
At each time, there are two generations of agents, the young and the old, each of
unit mass. Young agents work in young firms, old agents work in old firms. All
agents inelastically supply labor normalized at L¯= 1 per period.
The fixed capital stock, K¯ > 0, is owned the capitalists, a fraction η of the
62
Sand in the Wheels of Capitalism
old generation. Capitalists receive all firm profits and interest payments; they are
identical and diversified.3 It follows that capitalists receive
wOt +
rt +Πt
η
where Πt denotes aggregate firm profits. When capitalists die, a subset of their
children inherits the capital stock; a fraction η of the young workers turns into old
capitalists.
The population falls into four groups with identical lifetime income: young
workers (YW ), old workers (OW ), young workers that will be capitalists (YC),
and old capitalists (OC). The fraction of capitalists η ∈ (0,1) is a measure of
inequality among the old: higher η means more capitalists and less wealth per
capitalist.
As income cannot be saved or stored, agents consume all income in each pe-
riod. The lifetime utility of the young generation at time t is given by
UYWt := u(w
Y
t )+δu(wOt+1) (4.2.1)
for young workers, and by
UYCt := u
(
wYt
)
+δu
(
wOt+1+ st+1
)
(4.2.2)
for young capitalists, where δε(0,1] is the time discount factor; u is a standard fe-
licity function with u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0; and st := 1η (rtK¯+Πt). Remaining lifetime
utility of the old generation at time t is then
UOWt = u(w
O
t ) (4.2.3)
for the old workers, and
UOCt = u(w
O
t + st) (4.2.4)
for the old capitalists. Note that agents do not optimize over economic choices,
as they don’t save and supply labor inelastically. Instead, agents optimize over
3All the debt and equity in the economy is owned by the capitalists, who all hold the same
portfolio of assets.
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political choices, by choosing a capital market friction in each period.
4.2.3 Interaction
Firms and agents interact in competitive factor and product markets. The product
market is competitive and the price of the unique consumption good is normalized
to 1. Each segment of the labor market is competitive and wages, wjt , adjust until
the markets for young and old workers clear. There is one market for capital; it
is competitive in the sense that the interest rate, rt adjusts until the market clears,
but transactions on this market are subject to the reallocation cost, ct .
The reallocation cost is set by a vote: preceding market interaction, agents
vote over ct in each period. We return to the voting process in section 4, when we
discuss political equilibrium. Timing in each period is as follows,
1. an initial allocation of capital is inherited from the previous period;
2. agents vote over the capital market friction ct ;
3. economic activity results in a new allocation of capital; and
4. agents get their payoff, i.e., their wage and capital income.
The political conflict has two dimensions: there is a class conflict between cap-
italists and workers; and there is a generational conflict between young and old.
Old workers workers stand to lose most from free capital mobility: their wage
drops, as capital is reallocated from old firms to young firms. Old capitalists too
see their labor income drop, but their capital income increases. Preferences of the
young generation depend on the nature of the capital market frictions, in partic-
ular, whether they are linked over time. Young workers may vote in favor of a
positive reallocation cost, if they expect it to prevail until they are old. We analyze
policy preferences and the resulting political equilibria in section 4.4. First we
characterize the set of economic equilibria for a given sequence of capital market
frictions.
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4.3 Economic Equilibrium
4.3.1 Existence and Characterization
For a given sequence of capital market frictions,
Definition. An economic equilibrium is given by a sequence of factor prices and
capital allocations E = {rt ,wYt ,wOt ,KYt ,KOt }∞t=0 such that in every period (i) firms
maximize profits, and (ii) markets clear.
We prove the existence and uniqueness of an economic equilibrium for any
sequence of capital market frictions {ct}∞t=0 with 0 ≤ ct < ∞. In each period,
firms take all prices as given and maximize the period profits.4 Young firms start
without capital, and pay the reallocation cost on each unit of capital they employ.
They solve
max
KYt ,LYt
θYF(KYt ,LYt )− (rt + ct)KYt −wYt LYt
which leads to standard first-order conditions
θYFK(KYt ,LYt ) = rt + ct (4.3.1)
θYFL(KYt ,LYt ) = wYt (4.3.2)
and corresponding capital and labor demand, KYt (rt ,wYt ) and LYt (rt ,wYt ). Old firms
retain the capital they employed last period; they solve
max
KOt ,LOt
θOF(KOt ,LOt )− rtKOt − ctmax(0,KOt − KˆOt )−wOt LOt
which leads to standard first-order condition
θOFL(KOt ,LOt ) = wOt (4.3.3)
and corresponding labor demand LOt (wOt ,rt). Note that the profit function of old
firms is not differentiable at KˆOt and capital demand depends on whether old firms
4Firms maximize profits that accrue to their owners, i.e. the capitalists. As all capitalists are
old, firms maximize current profits only.
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adjust their capital. If old firms acquire extra capital in equilibrium, then KOt must
satisfy
θOFK(KOt ,LOt ) = rt + ct (4.3.4)
which is consistent if old firms indeed scale up, i.e., if
θOFK(KOt ,LOt )< θOFK(KˆOt ,LOt )
or
rt < θOFK(KˆOt ,LOt )− ct
Old firms increase their capital if the interest rate is sufficiently small; likewise,
old firms decrease their capital if the interest rate is sufficiently big, or
rt > θOFK(KˆOt ,LOt ).
For intermediate values of the interest rate, old firms keep using the capital they
from last period, KˆOt = KYt−1 .
In each period, young and old agents inelastically supply labor, normalized to
1, in their respective labor markets. As both segments of the labor market must
clear in equilibrium, we obtain the equilibrium wage rate as a function of capital
from (4.3.2) and (4.3.3):
wYt = θYFL(KYt ,1) (4.3.5)
wOt = θOFL(KOt ,1). (4.3.6)
Sector wages increase, or decrease, along with an increase, or decrease, of sector
capital.
Capital demand of young firms follows from (4.3.1) and, letting g(K) :=
FK(K,1), we can write
KYt (rt) = g
−1
(
rt + ct
θY
)
(4.3.7)
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Our earlier discussion shows that capital demand of old firms is
KOt (rt) =

g−1
(
rt+ct
θO
)
if rt < rt
g−1
(
rt
θO
)
if rt > r¯t
KˆOt if rt ≤ rt ≤ r¯t
(4.3.8)
with rt ≡ θOg(KˆOt )− ct , and r¯t ≡ θOg(KˆOt ). Total capital demand then is
ϕct (rt) := KYt (rt)+KOt (rt) (4.3.9)
and the capital market clears if ϕct (rt) = K¯. The following lemma shows that a
market clearing interest rate exists and is unique in each period.
Lemma 4.3.1. For 0≤ ct < ∞, there exists a unique market clearing interest rate
r∗t = r∗t (ct).
Proof. For any 0 ≤ ct < ∞, ϕct is continuous, strictly decreasing, and piecewise
differentiable in rt (with kinks at rt and r¯t). Furthermore, by the Inada conditions
we have
lim
r→∞ϕct (rt) = 0 and limrt→−ct
ϕct (rt) = ∞
Hence by the continuity of ϕct , there is r∗t >−ct such that
ϕct (r∗t ) = K¯ (4.3.10)
By the strict monotonicity of ϕct , r∗t is unique.
From the market clearing interest rate, r∗t , equilibrium capital demands and
sector wages readily follow.5 Hence, we have proven the following proposition:
Proposition 4.3.1. For any sequence of capital market frictions {ct}∞t=0 with 0≤
ct < ∞, there exists a unique economic equilibrium E.
The previous argument, and in particular capital demand of old firms, given
by (4.3.8), shows that the economic equilibrium is characterized by the initial
5If the market clearing interest rate is negative, we set it to 0, which implies that some capital
remains unused. We show in section 4.4.1 that no voter class wishes to set ct so high as to induce
a negative interest
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capital of the old firms, KˆOt , and the prevailing capital market friction in the capital
market, ct . We characterize firm behavior in equilibrium in the following.
Depending on the equilibrium interest rate, old firms adjust their capital, down-
or upward, or they keep the capital of last period. We investigate these cases in
turn. Old firms scale up capital if and only if the interest rate is sufficiently small,
or r∗t < rt , cf. (4.3.8). Market clearing then reads
g−1
(
r∗t + ct
θY
)
+g−1
(
r∗t + ct
θO
)
= K¯ (4.3.11)
which implicitly gives the equilibrium interest rate, r∗t ; old firms’ capital is given
by
KOt := g
−1
(
r∗t + ct
θO
)
(4.3.12)
It follows that old firms scale up if and only KˆOt <KOt . Note that, through (4.3.11),
old firms’ equilibrium capital, KOt , does not depend on ct .
Similarly, old firms scale down capital if and only if the interest rate is suffi-
ciently big, or r∗t > r¯t . Market clearing then reads
g−1
(
r∗t + ct
θY
)
+g−1
(
r∗t
θO
)
= K¯ (4.3.13)
which gives the interest rate. Old firms’ capital is given by
K¯Ot := g
−1
(
r∗t
θO
)
(4.3.14)
so that old firms scale down if and only if KˆOt < K¯Ot . Note that equilibrium capital
of old firms, K¯Ot = K¯O(ct), is a function of the capital market friction, ct .
Finally, old firms keep their initial capital if and only if
KOt ≤ KˆOt ≤ K¯Ot (ct)
in which case the equilibrium interest rate is given by
r∗t = θYg(K¯− KˆOt )− ct (4.3.15)
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This concludes the description of old firms in equilibrium.
Equilibrium behavior of young firms is easily described: as they have no initial
capital, they must adjust capital upward. It follows that equilibrium capital of
young firms is given by
g−1
(
r∗t + ct
θY
)
where r∗t depends on the equilibrium behavior of old firms, i.e., on KˆOt and ct .
As an illustration, consider the economic equilibrium if there is no capital
market friction, i.e., if ct = 0. Then there is only one cost of capital in the economy
and capital market clearing reads
g−1
(
r∗t
θY
)
+g−1
(
r∗t
θO
)
= K¯
As old firms are less productive than young firms, old firms employ less capital
than young firms in equilibrium if there is no capital market friction. If the capital
market friction is positive (ct > 0), then the decision of old firms to adjust capital
can go either way–as we have shown–and there is no guarantee that old firms
employ less capital than young firms. But in a dynamic economic equilibrium,
firms in the old sector do not scale up, except possibly in the first or second period..
Lemma 4.3.2. In economic equilibrium, old firms do not scale up if t ≥ 2.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary economic equilibrium and fix t ≥ 2. We prove that
KˆOt ≥ KOt , so that old firms do not scale up in period t. For our argument we
consider the economic equilibrium at time t− 2 and assume that ct−2 = 0. Then
old firm equilibrium capital is given by
KO∗t−2 = K
O
and is minimized across all state-parameter pairs (KˆOt−2,ct−2). By market clear-
ing, it follows that young firm capital
(
KY∗t−2
)
is maximized across state-parameter
pairs, and we denote it by K¯Y . Note that K¯Y exceeds KO, as young firms are more
productive than old firms. Moving forward one period, it follows that KˆOt−1 > K
O,
which means that old firms do not scale up in period t − 1. Hence equilibrium
old firm capital satisfies KO∗t−1 ≤ K¯Y , and market clearing implies that equilibrium
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young firm capital satisfies KY∗t−1 ≥ KO. We have shown that the minimum value
KY∗t−1 can take in equilibrium exceeds KO.
The intuition for Lemma 4.3.2 is that, independent of the sequence of capital
market frictions, young firms choose to employ more capital than what they will
need when they are old firms.
4.3.2 Steady States
For arbitrary sequences of frictions {ct}∞t=0, capital market activity has little struc-
ture. As we are mostly interested in stable political outcomes that yield constant
sequences of ct , we look for steady state equilibria.
Definition. A steady state is an economic equilibrium such that
(KYt ,KOt ) = (KYt+1,K
O
t+1) for all t.
In a steady state, the amount of capital that is reallocated from old firms to
young firms is constant over time; it is positive by lemma 4.3.2. The next propo-
sition gives all steady states that exist for a constant sequence of capital market
frictions.
Proposition 4.3.2. Given a constant sequence of capital market frictions {c}∞t=0,
there exists a bound c¯> 0 such that
1. for c ∈ [0, c¯], the unique steady state equilibrium is given by
KY∗ = g−1
(
r∗+ c
θY
)
, KO∗ = g−1
(
r∗
θO
)
(4.3.16)
with r∗ given by the market clearing condition,
g−1
(
r∗+ c
θY
)
+g−1
(
r∗
θO
)
= K (4.3.17)
(a) for c≥ c¯, the unique steady state equilibrium is given by
KY∗ = KO∗ =
1
2
K¯ (4.3.18)
with r∗ = θYg(12K¯)− c.
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Proof. For 1: Let time t capital allocations be given by (4.3.16). We check that
the same allocation of capital results in period t+1, for which it suffices to check
that old firms scale down in period t+1. Old firms scale down if and only if
KˆOt+1 = K
Y∗
t > K¯
O
t+1 (4.3.19)
where K¯Ot+1 = K¯
O(c) is the equilibrium cut-off level defined by (4.3.14). Note that
condition (4.3.19) holds for c = 0, since without frictions the more productive
young firms attracts more capital than the old firms. Taking the total derivative of
(4.3.17) with respect to c shows that r∗t + c is strictly increasing in c. It follows
that KY∗t is strictly decreasing in c. Furthermore, K¯Ot+1 is strictly increasing in
c as noted after (4.3.14). Hence, the proposed equilibrium is a steady state for
c ∈ [0, c¯], with c¯ defined by
KY∗t (c¯) = K¯O(c¯) (4.3.20)
Now consider the steady state for c= c¯. By the definition of c¯, we have KˆO = K¯O
which implies that old firms do not adjust capital, and so KO = KˆO. Since we also
have KˆO = KY , it follows that KO = KY = 12K¯ in this boundary case steady state.
With (4.3.16), we then obtain r∗ and c¯:
r∗ = θOg
(
1
2
K¯
)
and
c¯= (θY −θO)g
(
1
2
K¯
)
(4.3.21)
For 2: let c > c¯ and the time t allocations be given by (4.3.18). This allocation
induces the same capital allocation in period t+1, if
KO ≤ 1
2
K¯ < K¯Ot+1
The first inequality holds trivially by (4.3.11) and (4.3.12), the second holds by the
definition of c¯ since K¯Ot+1 = K¯
O(c). Finally, note that every economic equilibrium
is unique by lemma 4.3.1.
Proposition 4.3.2 gives all steady state equilibria that exist for constant sequences
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of capital market frictions {c}∞t=0. We denote these steady states by Ec.6 As a
benchmark, consider the steady state equilibrium that results if the capital market
is frictionless, E0. If the sequence of capital market frictions is given by ct = 0 for
all t, then all capital has the same rental price. It follows from proposition 4.3.2
that young firms’ capital is maximized in this steady state–and old firms’ capital
minimized. As total capital is constant and young firms are more productive than
old firms, E0 is the steady state in which maximum output is achieved. Hence
c= 0 would be chosen by a social planner if lump sum transfers are available.
In any period, a positive capital market friction reduces output, an economic
inefficiency. The economic inefficiency, however, does not constitute a Pareto
inefficiency, as old workers stand to benefit from it. We rule out vote buying
as a means to restore the economically efficient outcome, i.e., we rule out that
the capitalists compensate the workers to vote for a free (or frictionless) capital
market. As Acemoglu (2003) has argued, there is an essential hold-up problem
that prevents such trades from taking place: if the workers vote for ct = 0, the
capitalists have no incentive to compensate them ex post; likewise, the workers
have no incentive to vote for ct = 0, if they receive the compensation upfront.
4.4 Political Equilibrium
We endogenize the sequence of capital market frictions by treating the frictions
as politically determined. To include politics, we extend the economic model by
a simple majority vote in each period. In order to obtain closed form solutions,
we assume that production is Cobb-Douglas, with decreasing returns to scale;
production is given by
F(K,L) = KαLβ (4.4.1)
with 0< α+β < 1. We derive steady state capital allocations and factor prices in
appendix A.3.1.
6From the Proof of Prop 4.3.2, we see that a steady state with KY = KO = 12 K¯ also exists for
non constant sequences {ct}∞t=0 as long as c¯< ct < ∞. We do not consider these in the following.
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4.4.1 Policy Preferences
Voter preferences follow from the lifetime utility functions (4.2.1) - (4.2.4) and
equilibrium factor prices. Remember that for a given value of the reallocation
cost, ct , the economic equilibrium at time t is fully characterized by the initial
capital of old firms, KˆOt .7 The next lemma establishes two useful properties of the
equilibrium interest rate
Lemma 4.4.1. In each period, the equilibrium interest rate r∗t is strictly decreas-
ing in the reallocation cost ct , and r∗t + ct , is nondecreasing in ct .
Proof. (i) Let 0< ct < ∞. By lemma 4.3.1, there is a unique r∗t (ct) such that
ϕct (r∗t (ct)) = K¯
Now consider a c′t > ct . An inspection of (4.3.9) shows that ϕc′t < ϕct uniformly,
so ϕc′t (r
∗
t (ct))< K¯. Again by lemma 4.3.1, there is a unique r∗t (c′t) such that
ϕc′t (r
∗
t (c
′
t)) = K¯
Because ϕc′t is strictly monotonically decreasing, it follows that r
∗
t (c′t) < r∗t (ct).
(ii) Suppose that r∗t (ct)+ ct is decreasing in ct . Then result (i) implies that KY
∗
t
and KO
∗
t must increase in ct which contradicts market clearing.
The following lemma summarizes the comparative statics of factor prices, sec-
tor capital and voter class income with respect to ct . In order to have the necessary
generality to analyze out-of-steady-state deviations, the lemma is formulated for
arbitrary economic equilibria.
Lemma 4.4.2. Let c¯t be defined by
KˆOt = K¯t
O(c¯t). (4.4.2)
Then (i) KYt and wYt are strictly decreasing in ct ∈ [0, c¯t ] and constant for ct > c¯t ;
(ii) KOt and wOt are strictly increasing in ct ∈ [0, c¯t ] and constant for ct > c¯t ; (iii)
wOt + st is decreasing in ct .
7From lemma 4.3.2 we know that KˆOt ≥ KO, because old firms do not scale up in equilibrium.
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Proof. See appendix A.3.2
The function K¯t
O that yields the equilibrium cut-off value K¯t
O(c¯t) has been
defined after (4.3.14). Note that c¯t is the boundary value of the capital market
friction at which old firms keep their initial capital KˆOt : for lower values of the
friction, old firms scale down.8 The proof of the lemma is straightforward but
long and we provide it in the appendix.
Lemma 4.4.2 shows that total income of old capitalists is decreasing in ct ,
even as wages may be increasing; the positive wage effect is dominated by the
negative capital income effect.9 Note that once ct is fixed for a given period, the
equilibrium interest rate r∗t and all other time t equilibrium values readily follow.
Hence we may write lifetime utility of agents as a function of the capital market
frictions that prevail today and tomorrow:
Uit =U
i
t (ct ,ct+1) for iε{OW,OC,YW,YC}
We note that income of the old generation does not, in fact, depend on ct+1. The
following definition of single peakedness goes back to Black (1948).
Definition. Policy preferences of voter class iε{OW,OC,YW,YC} are single-
peaked if the following statement is true:
for any
ciεArgmax
ct
Ui(ct ,ct+1)
if c′′ ≤ c′ ≤ ci, or if ci ≤ c′ ≤ c′′, thenUi(c′′,ct+1)≤Ui(c′,ct+1).
As is well-known, with single-peaked preferences we can apply a median voter
theorem: for existence of an equilibrium of the simple majority vote, it suffices
that all voters have single-peaked preferences. Preferences of the old generation
can easily be characterized.
8Since we consider deviations out-of-steady-state here, we may restrict attention to values
KˆOt ≥ 12 K¯ in the following (cf. proposition 4.3.16). It follows that c¯t ≥ c¯, where c¯, given by
(4.3.20), is the boundary value of the steady state friction for which no reallocation of capital
takes place.
9This holds for any value of η .
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Lemma 4.4.3. In each period, preferences of the old generation are single-peaked,
and their preferred policies are
Argmax
ct
UOWt (ct ,ct+1) = [c¯t ,∞)
for the old workers, and
argmax
ct
UOCt (ct ,ct+1) = 0
for the old capitalists.
Proof. The preferences over ct follow from lemma 4.4.2. Because the utility of
theOC andOW class is monotonic in ct , it follows that they are also single peaked-
ness.
Turning to the preferences of the young, we note that lifetime utility of the
young generation depends on current policy ct as well as future policy ct+1. Keep-
ing tomorrow’s friction fixed, we obtain the young’s preferences over ct .
Lemma 4.4.4. Preferences of the young generation over ct are single-peaked, and
preferred policies are
argmax
ct
UYWt (ct ,ct+1) = 0
and
argmax
ct
UYCt (ct ,ct+1) = 0
Proof. Let ct+1 be fixed. The YW class and the YC class have the same income
wYt in period t. By lemma 4.4.2, wYt is strictly decreasing in ct . Hence, the utility
of the YW and YC are monotonically decreasing in ct which is sufficient for single
peakedness..
A majority consisting of old capitalists and all the young favor a capital mar-
ket without frictions. The intuition is that wages in the Y-sector and capitalist
income are maximized in a frictionless capital market. Importantly, we have de-
rived preferences keeping future policy fixed. If the future friction ct+1 depends
on the currently prevailing friction ct , then preferences of the young change while
preferences of the old are still given by lemma 4.4.3.
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Lemmas 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 show that young capitalists achieve maximum life-
time utility if ct = 0 and ct+1 = 0. Young workers on the other hand achieve
maximum utility if ct = 0 and ct+1 ≥ c¯t+1. Young workers prefer a frictionless
capital market when young and wish to see the maximum friction when old.
We turn to the question in which steady state the utility Uit of the different
voter classes iε{OW,OC,YW,YC} is maximized. Note that in steady state the
reallocation cost is time independent, as are the utilities, so that we may write
Ui =Ui(c). It follows from the above that UYC and UOC are maximized in the
steady state without friction, E0. Old worker utility UOW is maximized in steady
states with no capital reallocation, i.e. Ec with c≥ c¯. Young workers are the only
group who may have more interesting preferences as we show in the following.
Consider young worker utility UYW = u(wY )+ δu(wO). Steady state wages
follow from (4.3.5) and (4.3.6) and the steady state capital allocations we derived
in section A.3.1. We have
wY = θYβ
(
αθY
r(c)+ c
) α
1−α
; wO = θYβ
(
αθO
r(c)
) α
1−α
for c ∈ [0, c¯], and
wY = θYβ
(
1
2
K¯
) α
1−α
; wO = θYβ
(
1
2
K¯
) α
1−α
for c > c¯. The following lemma gives the preferred steady state policy of the
young worker.
Lemma 4.4.5. Steady state preferences of the young worker are single-peaked.
Their preferred policies are
• cYW = 0 if u
′(wY )
δu′(wO) >
r(c)
r(c)+c on (0, c¯),
– cYW = c¯ if u
′(wY )
δu′(wO) <
r(c)
r(c)+c on (0, c¯),
– otherwise cYW is given by
u′(wY )
δu′ (wO)
=
r(cYW )
r(cYW )+ cYW
(4.4.3)
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Proof. Consider UYW (c) on (0, c¯). Taking the derivative of UYW with respect to
c, we get
dUYW
dc
= u′(wY )
dwY
dc
+δu′
(
wO
) dwO
dc
(4.4.4)
Substituting dw
Y
dc and
dwO
dc in (4.4.4) yields
dUYW
dc
=
−βα
1−α
[
u′(wY )θY
(
KY
)α
r+ c
(
dr
dc
+1
)
+δu′
(
wO
)
θO
(
KO
)α
r
dr
dc
]
where KY and KO are the steady state capital allocations given by (A.3.2) and r
follows from KY +KO = K¯. Implicit differentiation of the capital market clearing
condition with respect to c shows that
dr
dc
+1=−
(
θO
θY
) 1
1−α (r+ c
r
) 1
1−α dr
dc
which we use to obtain
dUYW
dc
=
−β
1−α
dr
dc
1
r
KO[δu′
(
wO
)
r−u′ (wY)(r+ c)]
Since r and KO are nonnegative and drdc < 0, the first part of this expression is
positive for all c. Hence dU
YW
dc ≥ 0 if and only if
δu′
(
wO
)
r−u′ (wY)(r+ c)≥ 0 (4.4.5)
Note that u′
(
wY
)
(r+ c) strictly increases in c while δu′
(
wO
)
r strictly decreases
in c. It follows that if for some c condition (4.4.5) is satisfied with equality
then it is the unique utility maximizing steady state policy. Otherwise, either
δu′
(
wO
)
r− u′ (wY)(r+ c) > 0 for all cε(0, c¯) so that Argmax
c
UYW (c) = [c¯,∞);
or δu′
(
wO
)
r−u′ (wY)(r+ c)< 0 for all cε(0, c¯) so that
Argmax
c
UYW (c) = {0}
Finally note that preferences are single peaked.
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Lemma 4.4.5 shows that young workers may prefer a steady state with a positive
capital market friction. A positive c allows the young worker to smooth consump-
tion over his lifetime; the capital market friction works as a savings technology.
Equation (4.4.3) can be interpreted as an optimal savings condition. If utility is
linear, for example, there is no consumption smoothing motive and (4.4.3) cannot
be satisfied. Condition (4.4.3) shows that cYW depends on the functional form u,
the discount rate δ and technological factors θY and θO. Implicit derivation of
cYW gives the following comparative statics.
Lemma 4.4.6. cYW is increasing in δ ; decreasing in θO; and increasing in θY .
Lemma 4.4.6 is intuitive: the consumption smoothing motive is increased if
future consumption is valued more (increase in δ ) and if the wage gap between
young and old age is bigger (decrease in θO; increase in θY ). This concludes our
description of voter preferences.
4.4.2 Majority Voting
In this section we analyze equilibria under pure majority rule. A pure majority rule
is defined by three characteristics: (i) democracy is direct so that voters directly
choose their preferred capital market friction; (ii) voters vote sincerely; and (iii)
there is an open agenda so that all alternatives are considered in the vote. Every
period t, all agents cast a vote over the capital market friction ct .
Formally, an action at time t for a member of voter class i is a capital market
friction ait ∈ [0,∞), we also refer to actions as votes. At time t, the publicly known
history of the game is ht = (c0, ..,ct−1)εHt with Ht = [0,∞)t . A strategy for voter
class i at time t is given by a mapping vit : Ht → [0,∞).
Definition. A political economic equilibrium is a sequence of factor prices and
allocations E = {rt ,wYt ,wOt ,KYt ,KOt }∞t=0, supplemented with a voting strategy pro-
file v = {vYWt ,vYCt ,vOWt ,vOCt }∞t=0, such that (i) v is an equilibrium of the voting
game; and (ii) E is an economic equilibrium given the sequence of reallocation
costs {ct}∞t=0 in the outcome of v.
We focus on steady state equilibria that can be politically supported, i.e. steady
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state equilibria Ec for which there is a voting strategy v such that {Ec,v} is a
political economic equilibrium.
Open-Loop Equilibrium
As a benchmark we consider the political equilibrium that results if voters play
open-loop strategies, i.e. strategies that do not depend on history.
Proposition 4.4.1. If voters play open-loop strategies, then the unique political
economic equilibrium is given by E0 and the voting strategy profile v = {vYWt =
0,vYCt = 0,vOWt = c¯t ,vOCt = 0}∞t=0.
Proof. Strategy profile v follows from sincere voting and voter preferences de-
rived in lemma 4.4.3 and lemma 4.4.4. We see that a majority of agents votes for
ct = 0 in every period. The corresponding steady state is E0.
Capital market frictions cannot arise in the political equilibrium under open-
loop strategies. Capitalists achieve maximum lifetime utility in this equilibrium.
The young worker class, while decisive, does not achieve her maximum lifetime
income (which is achieved for c = cYW , cf. lemma 4.4.5). Open-loop strate-
gies leave no scope for cooperation between young workers in different periods.
This result is reminiscent of results in Sjoblom (1985) and Azariadis and Galasso
(2002), who show that social security cannot be supported if voters play open-loop
strategies.
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Once we allow for richer voting strategies, cooperation between subsequent young
generations can be achieved. In particular, any steady state in which the young
workers get a higher utility than their open loop utility can be supported as a
political equilibrium.
Proposition 4.4.2. There exists c∗ ∈ [0, c¯] such that for every c∈ [0,c∗], the steady
state equilibrium Ec can be politically supported.
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Proof. Consider the set
D :=
{
cε[0,∞)|UYW (c,c)≥UYW (0,0)}
D is nonempty, as 0 ∈ D; D is closed, as UYW is continuous; and D is convex, as
UYW is single-peaked. It follows that D is a closed interval which contains cYW ,
the preferred lifetime policy of the young workers (cf. lemma 4.4.5). Now, let
c∗ :=min{c¯,supD} and choose an arbitrary c ∈ [0,c∗]. Then Ec can be politically
supported. Consider the voting strategy profile v∗ = {vYWt ,vYCt ,vOWt ,vOCt }∞t=0 such
that
vYWt =
{
c if ct−s = c for s= 1, ...t
0 otherwise
vYCt = v
OC
t = 0
vOWt = c¯t
With this strategy profile the voting game equilibrium is c in every period provided
the play started with c0 = c. The best deviation of the YW class at time t is to set
ct = 0 given that vYWt+1 = 0. This deviation is not profitable since U
YW
t (0,0) ≤
UYWt (c,c). It remains to check that vYWt+1 = 0 is incentive compatible. It is because
UYWt+1(0,0)>U
YW
t+1(ct+1,0) for any ct+1 > 0. We have shown that v
∗ is a subgame
perfect strategy profile of the repeated voting game. We conclude that {Ec,v∗} is
a political economic equilibrium.
The political equilibria with subgame-perfect voting strategies can be inter-
preted as arising from social contract which allows for cooperation between cur-
rent and future young. The familiar logic for cooperation is that voters cooperate
as long as they expect future generations to honor the social contract if they do so
themselves.
Since there are multiple equilibria of the repeated voting game, there is no
guarantee that cooperation will be achieved. Following the literature on dynamic
political economy models, we can reduce the multiplicity of equilibria in two
ways. First, in the spirit of Azariadis and Galasso (2002), we may impose more
structure on the political model. Second, we may restrict the solution concept as
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in Hassler et al. (2003) and related work that studies policies that can be sustained
without commitment (e.g. Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull, 2008). We pursue both
routes in the following.
Policy Persistence
We restrict the political model and assume that voters cannot overturn policy in
every period. Instead, voters at time t set a persistent policy that lasts throughout
their lifetime (i.e. ct = ct+1). Note that this means that the next generation of
voters is disenfranchised.10
As agents vote sincerely, actions follow from voter preferences derived in sec-
tion 4.4.1. Recall that utility of old capitalists is maximized for ct = 0. Utility of
young capitalists is maximized for ct = 0 and ct+1 = 0. Hence all capitalists vote
for a zero friction, or
aOCt = a
YC
t = 0
If capitalists form a majority (i.e. η > 12), the policy outcome is ct = ct+1 = 0.
Consequently E0 is the unique steady state that can be politically supported if cap-
italists are a majority. If capitalists are a minority (i.e. η < 12)–the more realistic
case that we focus on in the following–then worker preferences are decisive for
the political equilibrium. We have seen before that utility of the old worker class
is maximized if all capital KˆOt is retained in the old firms where they work. It
follows that
aOWt = c¯t
As for the young worker class, they face a tradeoff: a higher capital market friction
leads to a decrease in their wage when young
(
wYt
)
and an increase in their wage
when old
(
wOt+1
)
. If young voters can set the policy for two periods, then they will
vote as if choosing among steady state utility levels.11
Lemma 4.4.7. Consider a vote at time t under policy persistence. Then young
workers choose aYWt = cYW , where cYW is given by lemma 4.4.5.
10However, we show that disenfranchised median voters are better off. The intuition is that the
YW class achieves higher utility if the next generation can be bound to its choice.
11It is not a priori clear whether the economy reaches a new steady state right after the vote at
time t. We show in the appendix that it does.
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Proof. See appendix A.3.2
The young worker is the median voter, with preferences in between those of
all the capitalist (who are a minority) and the old workers. We have the following
proposition,
Proposition 4.4.3. The unique political equilibrium if voters choose persistent
policies is given by EcYW and voting strategy profile v = {vYWt = cYW ,vYCt =
0,vOWt = c¯t ,vOCt = 0}∞t=0.
Proof. Strategy profile v follows from sincere voting and lemmas 4.4.3, 4.4.4 and
4.4.7. All preferences are single peaked so that the median voter is decisive. It
follows that ct = cYW in every period and the corresponding economic equilibrium
is EcYW .
The unique political equilibrium that arises if voters choose persistent policies
features the capital market friction cYW , which may be strictly positive (cf. lemma
4.4.5). The young worker class, which is pivotal in the vote, achieves maximum
lifetime utility in this political equilibrium.
Markovian Policies
Markovian equilibria are subgame-perfect equilibria in which the the policy vari-
able is a time-invariant function of the state variable. In the present context, the
natural state variable is kt := KˆOt = KYt−1. We restrict the choice of the decisive
voter class to a Markovian policy function,
ct = µ(kt) (4.4.6)
and assume that µ(.) is time invariant and differentiable.
The transition function T gives next period’s state variable as a function of this
period’s state variable and current policy. The transition function follows from
firm behavior derived in section 4.3.1, evaluated for a Cobb-Douglas production
function, so
T : [0, K¯]× [0,∞)→ [0, K¯]
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is given by
T (kt ,ct) =

(θY)
1
1−α
(θY )
1
1−α +(θO)
1
1−α
K¯ if kt < KO
K¯− kt if KO ≤ kt < K¯O(ct)(
αθY
r∗t (ct)+ct
) 1
1−α with r∗t (ct) given by(
αθY
r∗(ct)+ct
) 1
1−α +
(
αθO
r∗(ct)
) 1
1−α = K¯
if kt ≥ K¯O(ct)
Our transition function takes a simple form as it is stationary and does not depend
on future policy ct+1. Young workers now solve
µ(kt) = argmaxct
UYWt (ct ,ct+1;kt)
subject to ct+1 = µ(kt+1), ct ∈ [0,∞]
kt+1 = T (kt ,ct)
In words, the function µ must yield a ct such that utility of the YW class is maxi-
mized, taking into account any effect the choice of ct has on future policy through
the state variable kt+1.
To develop some intuition for the solution of this problem, consider trivial
Markovian policy functions of the form
µ(kt) =C
Then the optimization problem reduces simply to
max
ct
UYWt (ct ,C)
which, by lemma 4.4.4, is uniquely solved for ct = 0. It follows that
µ(kt) = 0
is the solution to the young worker’s problem. Consequently, ct = 0 is the outcome
of the voting game for any t. Thus we have shown that E0, the steady state without
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frictions, is politically supported by the trivial Markovian voting strategy µ(kt) =
0. A priori, there could be other steady states that are politically supported. But
we are able to rule this out in the following. Note that in steady state we have
KY (c)≥ K¯O(c)
which implies that the transition function T reduces to
h(c) = T (k,c) =
(
αθY
r+ c
) 1
1−α
a strictly decreasing function of c on [0, c¯]. Since we must also have
c= µ(h(c))
we see that µ(k) = h−1(k). But this cannot be a solution to the young worker’s
optimization problem since
argmax
ct
UYWt (ct ,ct)
is independent of k, cf. lemma 4.4.5. We conclude that there are no steady
states, besides E0, that can be politically supported using Markovian policy func-
tions. The impossibility to politically support steady states (other than E0) through
Markovian voting strategies results from the fact that the pivotal young workers’
optimal choice is independent of the state variable. Hence, the form of ct imposed
by (4.4.6) can only lead to trivial solutions.
4.4.3 Illustration: CRRA Utility
As an illustration, we solve for the political equilibrium under persistent policy
voting with CRRA utility. Let the felicity function u be given by
ug(w) :=
{
w1−g
1−g for g> 0,g .= 1
lnw for g= 1
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We derive the policy outcome if voters choose persistent policies (cf. also propo-
sition 4.4.3)
Lemma 4.4.8. If voters choose persistent policies, the unique outcome cYW of the
voting game in every period is given by
cYW =

0 if δA
−g
1+g(γ−1) ≤ 1(
δA
−g
1+g(γ−1) −1
)
r if 1< δA
−g
1+g(γ−1) < θ
Y
θO
c¯ if δA
−g
1+g(γ−1) ≥ θYθO
with γ := 11−α and A :=
(
θO
θY
)γ
.
Proof. Taking the derivative ofUYW with respect to c we have shown (cf. lemma
4.4.5) that dU
YW
dc ≥ 0 if and only if
u′
(
wY
)
(r+ c)−δu′
(
wO
)
r ≤ 0 (4.4.7)
With CRRA utility this rewrites as
β−gα−g(γ−1)
(
θY
)−gγ [(r+ c)1+g(γ−1)−δA−gr1+g(γ−1)]≤ 0
so that lifetime utility of the young is increasing in the reallocation cost iff(
r+ c
r
)
≤ δA
−g
1+g(γ−1) (4.4.8)
The utility maximizing policy now follows from this condition. First note that
( r+cr ) is increasing in c; and that we have (
r+c¯
r ) =
θY
θO , so that
1≤ r+ c
r
≤ θ
Y
θO
for cε[0, c¯]. We see that if
δA
−g
1+g(γ−1) ≤ 1
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thenUYW is decreasing in c so that cYW = 0. Likewise if
δA
−g
1+g(γ−1) ≥ θ
Y
θO
thenUYW is increasing in c so that cYW = c¯ Finally if
1< δA
−g
1+g(γ−1) <
θY
θO
then dU
YW
dc switches sign on [0, c¯] and c
YW is given by
cYW =
(
δA
−g
1+g(γ−1) −1
)
r(cYW )
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we model political support for distortionary capital market fric-
tions. We show that workers in democracies may successfully oppose the reallo-
cation of capital to newer sectors, as this affects their labor rents.
Besides class difference, we identify age difference as a source of political
conflict. The political conflict exists as long as capital and labor are complemen-
tary factors of production, as long as human capital is less mobile than physical
capital, and as long as human capital risk cannot be fully insured.
We identify young workers as the decisive voter class–under the plausible as-
sumption that capitalists are a minority. Young workers are decisive because their
preferences are less polarized than preferences of other groups in society. Young
workers are hurt by capital market frictions in the short term, but may still favor
them to smooth consumption over their lifetime. Young workers prefer a higher
friction (i) if technology grows at a faster pace,(ii) if they place more weight on
the future, and (iii) if they are more risk averse; the result holds as long as young
workers expect the capital market friction to persist.
A special case is when capitalists form a majority; in this case, our model
predicts that no capital market frictions arise. Broad capital market participation
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is found in some democracies, in particular those with funded pension schemes. It
would be interesting to see if capital reallocation is less restricted in democracies
with fully funded pension systems.
The voting process is critical for the outcome of the voting game: the political
equilibrium depends on the ability of a current majority to establish a persistent
policy. When policies may be overturned in each period, the model features mul-
tiple equilibria. By contrast, the equilibrium prediction is the unique outcome
favored by the young worker if the outcome of the vote is irreversible.
Our main contribution is to explain why unrestricted capital mobility may be
opposed in democracies as a result of the wealth and age distribution in a country’s
population. We identify young workers as the decisive class in society. What
makes them pivotal is not their number–they are a minority just as every other
voter class–but the fact that their preferences are the least extreme.
A crucial assumption in our model is that agents cannot save, so a capital mar-
ket friction is necessary for self insurance. If we reinterpret the drop in wages as
a decline in employment, then our findings hold even if households can store their
income.12 The capital market friction then becomes an unemployment insurance
that young workers take out in order to have a quiet life.
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Appendix: Proofs
This appendix contains the proofs of Chapter 2 (Incentive-Compatible Sovereign
Debt), Chapter 3 (Collective Pension Funds), and Chapter 4 (Sand in the Wheels
of Capitalism).
A.1 Proofs of Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3:
Proof. Let (O1, Id) be an optimal contract and let D be the constant value of O1
when Id(y) = 0. Consider a new contract (O˜1, I˜d) given by
I˜d(y) =
 0 if D˜≤min{γy+B,y}1 if D˜>min{γy+B,y}
and
O˜1(y) =
 D˜ if I˜d(y) = 0γy if I˜d(y) = 1
and suppose first that D˜=D. If I˜d(y) = Id(y), then the construction of O˜1 implies
that O˜1(y)≥O1(y). If I˜d(y)< Id(y), i.e. if I˜d(y) = 0 and Id(y) = 1, then it follows
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from proposition 2.3.2 that
O1(y)≤ D≤ O˜1(y)
Furthermore, we can rule out I˜d(y) > Id(y). To see this, suppose that y is such
that I˜d(y) = 1 and Id(y) = 0. Then we know that O1(y) = D, but this cannot be,
as we also know that γy+B< D from I˜d(y) = 1, and an optimal contract must be
repudiation proof. This proves that O˜1(y)≥ O1(y) if D˜= D.
Now, one can choose D˜ ≤ D such that the investor participation constraint
is still satisfied. By construction, the resulting contract (O˜1, I˜d) satisfies truthful
revelation and is repudiation-proof–like any sovereign debt contract. As I˜d(y) ≤
Id(y), it must be optimal.
Since both (O1, Id) and (O˜1, I˜d) are optimal contracts, we have
E(Id− I˜d)B= 0
Consider the state observation function Id(y). For all states y ∈
[
0, D−Bγ
)
we
must have Id(y) = 1, since Id(y) = 0 would mean that O1(y) = D which con-
tradicts repudiation-proofness. There may be more states for which Id(y) = 1,
as we only know that Id(y) ≥ I˜d(y). Let T2 denote the set of those states, so
T2 =
{
y≥ D−Bγ
∣∣∣ Id(y) = 1}. We see that
EId =
D−B
γˆ
0
1 f (y)dy+
ˆ
T2
1 f (y)dy
furthermore we have
EI˜d =
D˜−B
γˆ
0
1 f (y)dy
Now since D˜ ≤ D and B > 0, it follows that (i) D = D˜ and (ii) T2 has probability
mass zero; hence we see that Id = I˜d almost surely. It follows that, as EO1 = EO˜1,
we must also have that O1 = O˜1 almost surely, and I conclude that the optimal
contract is a sovereign debt contract.
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A.2 Proofs of Chapter 3
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2.1
The dynamic investment problem to solve is1
max
αt ,αt+1
Eu(b˜)
such that
wt = 0
wt+1 = αt(1+ r˜t)+(y−αt)
wt+2 = αt+1(1+ r˜t+1)+(wt+1+ y−αt+1)
b˜ = wt+2
First, we rewrite this problem in recursive form
vt(wt) =maxαt
Evt+1 ((wt + y)+α r˜) (A.2.1)
where vt , the remaining-value function, is a function of the financial reserve, wt .
We know that vt+2(w) = u(w) = w
1−φ
1−φ , as individuals consume their financial re-
serve in retirement. Note that vt(0) is the expected utility in retirement of a young
individual at time t who invests optimally throughout his life. Optimal investment,
αt , is a function of the single state variable, wt .
We consider the trial solution function vt+1(wt+1) = γt+1 (wt+1+ht+1)
1−φ
1−φ , where
γt+1 > 0 is a scalar and ht+1is the human capital reserve of an individual. Our trial
solution implies that
vt+1 ((wt + y)+αt r˜) = γt+1
((wt + y)+αt r˜+ht+1)1−φ
1−φ
= γt+1
(wt +ht +αt r˜)1−φ
1−φ
1We drop the superscripts to save on notation.
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so that the first-order condition reads as
γt+1Er˜ (wt +ht +αt r˜)−φ = 0
Solving for optimal investment in the risky asset yields
αt(wt) = a∗ (wt +ht)
where
a∗ :=
(−rl(1−p)
rhp
) 1
φ −1
rl− rh
(−rl(1−p)
rhp
) 1
φ
(A.2.2)
Finally, it follows from (A.2.1) that
vt(wt) = γt+1E
(wt +ht +a∗ (wt +ht) r˜)1−φ
1−φ
= δγt+1
(wt +ht)1−φ
1−φ
where
δ := E (1+a∗r˜)1−φ
so that our trial solution is correct with γt = δγt+1. Note that
δ ≈ 1+(1−φ)a∗µ > 1
where we’ve used a first-order approximation. We conclude that, conditional on
an optimal investment strategy, expected lifetime utility of the young at time t is
vt(0) = δ 2u(ht)
= δ 2u(2y)
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A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2.2
Incomplete markets give rise to additional constraints, αt = 0 and αt+1 ≤ wt+1.
To obtain a lower bound for the welfare loss due to credit constraints, we assume
that the middle-aged do not face constraints, only the young do. Then the new
investment problem is
max
αt+1
Eu
(
b˜
)
such that
wt = 0
wt+1 = y
wt+2 = αt+1 (1+ r˜t+1)+(wt+1+ y−αt+1)
b˜ = wt+2
It is easy to see that the middle aged will invest a∗ (2y) so that
wt+2 = 2y(1+a∗r˜t+1)
and
Eu
(
b˜
)
= Eu(2y(1+a∗r˜t+1))
= E (1+a∗r˜t+1)1−φ u(2y)
= δ u(2y)
With proposition 4.3.2 we see that the lower bound for the welfare loss due to
credit constraints is (
δ 2−δ)u(2y)
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A.3 Proofs of Chapter 4
A.3.1 Cobb-Douglas Production
We derive the steady state equilibria for a Cobb-Douglas production economy,
where F is given by
F(K,L) = KαLβ (A.3.1)
with 0< α+β < 1. Steady-state capital allocations for c ∈ [0, c¯] are
KY∗ =
(
αθY
r∗(c)+ c
) 1
1−α
; KO∗ =
(
αθO
r∗(c)
) 1
1−α
(A.3.2)
with r∗(c) given by capital market clearing condition
(
αθY
r∗(c)+ c
) 1
1−α
+
(
αθO
r∗(c)
) 1
1−α
= K¯
The boundary value c¯ follows from (4.3.21) and is given by
c¯= α θ
Y −θO(1
2K¯
)1−α
For c> c¯ we have steady state capital allocations
KY∗ =
(
αθY
r∗(c)+ c
) 1
1−α
; , KO∗ =
1
2
K¯
where capital market clearing condition
(
αθY
r∗(c)+ c
) 1
1−α
=
1
2
K¯
allows us to obtain the equilibrium interest rate explicitly,
r∗(c) =
αθY(1
2K¯
)1−α − c
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Next we determine what steady state equilibria can be politically supported.
A.3.2 Proof of lemma 4.4.2
Consider the equilibrium interest rate in period t. For ct < c¯t , we have KˆOt ≥ K¯Ot
so that old dirms scale down and the interest rate is given by
(
αθY
rt + ct
) 1
1−α
+
(
αθO
rt
) 1
1−α
= K¯
Implicit differentation yields
− 1
1−α
KYt
rt + ct
(
drt
dct
+1
)
− 1
1−α
KOt
rt
drt
dct
= 0 (A.3.3)
which rewrites as
drt
dct
=− K
Y
t
KYt +KOt (
rt+ct
rt )
so that drtdct ε(−1,0). For ct ≥ c¯t , we have KOt = KˆOt and the interest rate is given
by (
αθY
rt + ct
) 1
1−α
= K¯− KˆOt
rt =
αθY(
K¯− KˆOt
)1−α − ct
and we see that drtdct =−1. Now for (i), capital in the Y-sector is given by
KYt =
(
αθY
rt + ct
) 1
1−α
Taking the derivative with respect to ct gives
dKYt
dct
=
−1
1−α
KYt
rt + ct
(
drt
dct
+1
)
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so that dK
Y
t
dct < 0 for ct ∈ [0, c¯t) and
dKYt
dct = 0 for c≥ c¯t . Wages in the Y-sector are
wYt = θYβ
(
KYt
)α
Taking the derivative with respect to ct yields
dwYt
dct
=− β
1−αK
Y
t
(
drt
dct
+1
)
(A.3.4)
so that dw
Y
t
dct < 0 for ct ∈ [0, c¯t ];
dwYt
dct = 0 for ct > c¯t . For (ii), capital in the O-sector
is given by
KOt =
(
αθO
rt
) 1
1−α
for ct < c¯t ; and
KOt = Kˆ
O
for ct ≥ c¯t . Hence dK
O
t
dct > 0 for ct ∈ [0, c¯t) and
dKOt
dct = 0 for ct ≥ c¯t . Wages in the
O-sector are
wOt = θOβ
(
KOt
)α
Taking the derivative with respect to ct gives
dwOt
dct
=− β
1−αK
O
t
drt
dct
(A.3.5)
so that dw
O
dct > 0 for ctε[0, c¯t) and
dwOt
dct = 0 for ct ≥ c¯t . For (iii), first consider
profits. Let piYt and piOt denote profits in the Y- and O-sector respectively. Then
piYt = θY
(
KYt
)α − (rt + ct)KYt −wYt
and
piOt = (θO)(KOt )α − rtKOt −wOt
We take the derivative of piYt with respect to ct and obtain
dpiYt
dct
=
α+β −1
1−α
(
drt
dct
+1
)
KYt
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so that dpi
Y
t
dct < 0 for ct ∈ [0, c¯t) and
dpiYt
dct = 0 for c ≥ c¯t . Similarly, for O-sector
profits, we get
dpiOt
dct
=
α+β −1
1−α
drt
dct
KOt
so that dpi
O
t
dct > 0 for ct ∈ [0, c¯t) and
dpiOt
dct > 0 for ct ≥ c¯t . Turning to total profits,
Πt = piYt +piOt , we have
dΠt
dct
=
α+β −1
1−α
[(
drt
dct
+1
)
KYt +
drt
dct
KOt
]
(A.3.6)
and we see that Πt is decreasing in ct iff
drt
dct
K¯+KYt ≥ 0
Recall that for ct ∈ [0, c¯t) we have
drt
dct
=− K
Y
t
KYt +KOt (
rt+ct
rt )
so that − drtdct K¯ ≤ KYt and total profits are nonincreasing in ct . For ct ≥ c¯t , we
have drtdct = −1 so that total profits are increasing in ct . This result is due to the
fact that rt declines in ct while the allocation of capital does not change in this
range of capital market frictions. Hence the cost of capital goes down for O-firms,
stays the same for Y-firms, as production in both sectors remains the same. While
profits may increase in ct , capital income cannot. Recall that capital income is
given by
st =
rtK¯+Πt
η
For ct ∈ [0, c¯t), we have dΠtdct ≤ 0 so that dstdct ≤ 0. For ct ≥ c¯t we have
dst
dct
=
1
η
(
−K¯+ 1−α−β
1−α K
O
t
)
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so that dstdct < 0. Now, old capitalists income is given by
wOt + st
Let ct ∈ [0, c¯t), then we have
d(wOt + st)
dct
= − β
1−αK
O
t
drt
dct
+
1
η
(
β
1−α
drt
dct
K¯+
α+β −1
1−α K
Y
t
)
< − β
1−αK
O
t
drt
dct
+
β
1−α
drt
dct
K¯
< 0
Next, for ct ≥ c¯t , dw
O
t
dct = 0 and
dst
dct < 0 which shows part (iii).
A.3.3 Proof of Lemma 4.4.7
To prove lemma 4.4.7,we first prove two auxiliary lemmas that give the economic
equilibrium in periods t and t+1. Since we consider out-of steady-state dynamics
we assume that the equilibrium at time t− 1 is given by steady state allocations
for some arbitrary c ∈ [0, c¯]. The first lemma describes the economic equilibrium
after a downward change in policy:
Let the economic equilibrium at time t−1 be given by steady state values for
some c≤ c¯. Consider a downward change in policy ct = ct+1 ≤ c, then
KYt =
(
αθY
r∗t + ct
) 1
1−α
and
KOt+1 =
(
αθO
r∗t
) 1
1−α
with r∗t given by KYt +KOt = K¯, furthermore KYt+1 = KYt and KOt+1 = K
O
t .
Since ct ≤ c, we have K¯O(c) ≥ K¯O(ct), where K¯O is the equilibrium cut-off
value function defined after (4.3.14). It follows that
KˆOt = K
Y
t−1 ≥ K¯O(ct)
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so that KYt and KOt are as posed. Note that because ct ≤ c, we have KOt < KOt−1 by
lemma 4.4.1 and hence KYt > KYt−1 by market clearing . We must verify that the
same allocation obtains in period t+1. Moving forward one period we have
KˆOt+1 = K
Y
t > K¯
O(ct+1)
so that again old firms scale down, the same interest rate obtains (i.e. r∗t = r∗t+1),
and allocations are as posed.
Lemma A.3.3 shows that a downward change in policy results in steady state
values that correspond to a lower reallocation cost. Informally, we can say that
changing policy downward moves the economy to a new steady state correspond-
ing to the new value of the friction ct . The same need not be true for an upward
policy change as the next lemma shows.
Let the economic equilibrium at time t−1 be given by steady state values for
some c≤ c¯. Consider an upward change in policy ct = ct+1 > c, then
(i) if ct ≤ c¯ we have
KYt =
(
αθY
r∗t + ct
) 1
1−α
; KOt =
(
αθO
r∗t
) 1
1−α
with r∗t given by KYt +KOt = K¯, furthermore KYt+1 = KYt and KOt+1 = K
O
t ;
(ii) if c¯< ct ≤ c¯t we have
KYt =
(
αθY
r∗t + ct
) 1
1−α
; KOt =
(
αθO
r∗t
) 1
1−α
with r∗t given by KYt +KOt = K¯, furthermore KYt+1 = KOt and KOt+1 = K
Y
t ; and
(iii) if ct > c¯t we have
KYt = K¯− KˆOt ; KOt = KˆOt
furthermore KOt+1 = K
Y
t and KYt+1 = K
O
t .
For (i): suppose c < ct ≤ c¯. Then also ct ≤ c¯t , where c¯t is given by (4.4.2).
Hence we have
KYt−1 = KˆOt ≥ K¯O(ct)
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by the monotonicity of K¯O. It follows that old firms scale down and KYt and KOt
are as posed. Consider period t+1. Since ct = ct+1 ≤ c¯, we have
KYt (ct) = Kˆ
O
t+1 ≥ K¯O(ct+1)
by the definition of c¯, given by (4.3.21), and the monotonicity in of KY and K¯O in
ct . Hence KYt+1 and K
O
t+1 are as posed.
For (ii): suppose c¯< ct ≤ c¯t . Then we have
KˆOt ≥ K¯O(ct)
so that old firms scale down and allocations are as posed. Moving forward one
period it follows from c¯< ct = ct+1 that
KYt (ct)< K¯
O(ct+1)
Hence old firms do not adjust capital and KOt+1 = K
Y
t . By market clearing then
KYt+1 = K
O
t .
For (iii): suppose c¯t < ct , then KˆOt < K¯O(ct) so that old firms do not adjsut
capital. It follows that KOt = KˆOt and, by market clearing, KYt = K¯ − KˆO. In
period t+1, since c¯< ct = ct+1 we have KˆOt+1 < K¯
O(ct+1) and so KOt+1 = K
Y
t and
KYt+1 = K
O
t .
Lemma A.3.3 shows that a small upward change in policy (ct ≤ c¯) results in
steady state allocations that correspond to a higher friction. Now, consider lifetime
utility UYWt of the young worker at time t. Lemma A.3.3 also implies that young
workers will not vote for a higher friction than c¯. To see this note that KYt and
KOt+1 are strictly decreasing in ct for c¯< ct ≤ c¯t ; they are constant in ct for ct > c¯t .
Hence young workers strictly prefer ct = c¯ over any ct > c¯.
With the auxiliary lemmas, we can now proof lemma 4.4.7.The choice of a
persistent friction, ct = ct+1 ∈ [0,∞], uniquely determines the equilibrium interest
rates, r∗t and r∗t+1, and hence the economic equilibrium at time t and t + 1 (cf
lemma 4.3.1). Let cYWt denote the preferred policy of the YW class. We have
shown that cYWt ε[0, c¯] and that, if this policy is set, the economy attains steady
state values corresponding to the friction cYWt . It follows that cYWt = cYW , where
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cYW is given by lemma 4.4.5. By sincere voting we have aYWt = cYW , which
concludes the proof.
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Summaries
English Summary
This dissertation investigates capital market frictions across three themes, pre-
sented in three stand-alone chapters (Chapters 2-4). Chapter 2 deals with sovereign
debt. Recent experience in the EU shows that it can be complex to enforce the re-
payment promises of states. Furthermore, governments are better informed about
their repayment capacity than creditors are. In this dissertation, I argue that en-
forcement and information problems explain why states issue debt contracts that
frequently lead to debt crises. Such contracts are optimal because they save on
costly audits by creditors.
Chapter 3 deals with collective pension funds. It is often argued that pension
funds can enhance the welfare of their participants. In this dissertation, I highlight
one rationale for pension funds based on credit constraints. I then argue that
pension funds’ actual ability to increase welfare may be limited due to an agency
problem.
Chapter 4 deals with political intervention in capital markets. Financial liber-
alization and expanded access to capital are historically seen as signs of greater
freedom. Yet many democratic states choose to restrain the resource allocation
called for by free capital markets. In this dissertation, I argue that democracies
may choose to introduce restraints on free capital markets—thereby favouring in-
come stability over economic growth—depending on demographical context, the
distribution of wealth, and the rate of technological progress.
Summaries
Nederlandse Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt kapitaalmarktfricties in drie op zichzelf staande hoofd-
stukken met verschillende thema’s (hoofdstukken 2-4). Hoofdstuk 2 gaat in op
overheidsfinanciering en overheidsschuld. Recente ervaring in de EU laat zien
dat betalingsbeloftes van staten dikwijls niet af te dwingen zijn. Overheden zijn
daarnaast beter geïnformeerd over hun terugbetalingscapaciteit dan hun schuld-
eisers. In dit proefschrift betoog ik dat handhavings- en informatieproblemen
verklaren waarom staten zich financieren met contracten die regelmatig leiden tot
heronderhandelingen en schuldencrises. Dergelijke contracten zijn toch te zien
als optimaal, omdat ze besparen op dure audits door de schuldeisers.
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat over collectieve pensioenfondsen. Er wordt vaak beweerd
dat collectieve pensioenfondsen het welzijn van hun deelnemers kunnen verho-
gen. In dit proefschrift richt ik me op één mogelijkheid daarvoor: collectieve pen-
sioenfondsen, zoals die onder andere in Nederland te vinden zijn, kunnen het wel-
zijn van deelnemers verhogen door de kredietbeperkingen van jonge deelnemers
op te heffen. Aansluitend betoog ik dat een agency probleem de daadwerkelijke
welzijnsverhogende bijdrage van pensioenfondsen in de praktijk kan beperken.
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat over politieke interventie in kapitaalmarkten. Financiële
liberalisering en uitbreiding van de toegang tot kapitaal zijn historisch gezien te-
kenen van een grotere vrijheid. Toch zijn er veel democratische staten die ervoor
kiezen om de vrije kapitaalmarkt aan banden te leggen. In dit proefschrift be-
toog ik dat democratieën kunnen kiezen om beperkingen in te voeren op de vrije
kapitaalmarkt–waarmee ze feitelijk inkomensnivellering verkiezen boven econo-
mische groei–afhankelijk van de demografische context, kapitaalmarktparticipa-
tie, en de snelheid van technologische vooruitgang.
Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht Kapitalmarkt Friktionen in drei, in sich ge-
schlossene, Kapitel mit verschiedenen Themen (Kapitel 2-4). Kapitel 2 beschäf-
tigt sich mit der Staatsverschuldung. Jüngste Erfahrungen in der EU zeigen, dass
die Rückzahlungsversprechen von Staaten oft nicht durchsetzbar sind. Zudem sind
104
Summaries
Regierungen besser über ihre Rückzahlungsfähigkeit informiert als ihre Gläubi-
ger. In Kapitel 2 dieser Arbeit argumentiere ich dass die beschriebene Informations-
und Durchsetzungsprobleme erklären können warum Staaten sich über Verträge
finanzieren die regelmäßig neu verhandelt werden müssen und zu Schuldenkrisen
führen. Solche Verträge können dennoch optimal sein, weil sie auf kostspielige
Prüfungen durch die Gläubiger sparen.
Kapitel 3 beschäftigt sich mit Rentenkassen. Es wird oft argumentiert, dass
Rentenkassen mit verpflichtende Teilnahme–so wie es zum Beispiel in den Nie-
derlanden üblich ist–die Wohlfahrt ihrer Teilnehmer steigern können. In dieser
Dissertation, untersuche ich eine mögliche Begründung für diese Behauptung;
eine Begründung die sich basiert auf Kreditbeschränkungen von jüngeren Teil-
nehmerkohorten. Anschließend argumentiere ich dass ein Agentur Problem den
Wohlfahrt förderlichen Beitrag der Rentenkassen in der Praxis begrenzt.
Kapitel 4 beschäftigt sich mit politischem Eingreifen auf den Kapitalmärkten.
Liberalisierung der Finanzmärkte und einen erweiterten Zugang zu den Kapital-
märkten werden historisch als Anzeichen für eine größere Freiheit gesehen. Den-
noch entscheiden viele demokratische Staaten sich um den freien Kapitalverkehr
Einhalt zu gebieten. In dieser Dissertation argumentiere ich dass Demokratien sich
für Beschränkungen des freien Kapitalverkehrs entscheiden–und so Einkommens-
stabilität über wirtschaftlichen Wachstum begünstigen–in Abhängigkeit von den
demographischen Kontext, von der Verteilung des Reichtums und von der Rate
des technischen Fortschritts.
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